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  INTRODUCTION   
President Barack H. Obama has repeatedly stated that he 
views a capacity for empathy as an essential attribute of a good 
judge.1 And conservatives have heaped mountains of scorn up-
on him for saying so—accusing him of expressing open con-
tempt for the rule of law.2 To date, the debate has been surpris-
ingly one-sided. One federal judge has recently noted that 
“President Obama’s statement that judges should have ‘empa-
thy’ was met with strong criticism from his opponents and un-
comfortable silence from his supporters.”3 No one has yet of-
fered a sustained scholarly defense of the President’s call for 
empathy in judging.4  
This Article seeks to fill that void. Part I summarizes and 
critiques the agonizingly simplistic and misleading public and 
political debate over the proper role empathy (and its popular 
adversary—umpiring) in the judicial craft. It laments the suc-
cess that the President’s critics have had in misleadingly por-
traying the judicial selection process as a choice between con-
servative judges who simply call balls and strikes and decide 
all cases according to determinative rules set down by the gov-
erning sources of law, and liberal judges whose reliance on em-
pathy amounts to ignoring the law and deciding cases in favor 
of whichever party seems more sympathetic. Part II then exam-
ines the treatment of the President’s call for judicial empathy 
at the hands of conservative legal intellectuals, which, disap-
pointingly, tends to be only marginally more nuanced.  
In Part III, the Article explains that empathy is properly 
defined as the cognitive ability to understand a situation from 
the perspective of other people, combined with the emotional 
capacity to comprehend and feel those people’s emotions in that 
situation. Part III then contrasts empathy with the entirely 
distinct concept of sympathy. Empathy involves feeling and 
understanding the emotions that other people feel; sympathy 
involves feeling sorry for other people.  
 
 1. See infra Part IV.A. 
 2. See infra Parts II, III. 
 3. Kim McLane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons 
from Judge Cardozo, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1629, 1647 (2010). 
 4. See John Paul Rollert, Reversed on Appeal: The Uncertain Future of 
President Obama’s “Empathy Standard,” 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 89, 90 (2010), 
available at http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/903.pdf (noting that the Left 
has steadfastly avoided a “scholastic debate over the merits of empathy”).  
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In Part IV, the Article seeks to explain why empathy is in 
fact an essential characteristic of a good judge. The President’s 
critics might be surprised to find that the argument here is nei-
ther grounded in extralegal, touchy-feely notions of humanity 
and compassion nor based on some sort of radical vision of 
wealth redistribution through activist courts. Nor, for that mat-
ter, does it spring from a post-Realist rejection of “law” as a le-
gitimate constraining force on judges. Quite to the contrary, the 
argument is grounded in a firm commitment to the rule of law 
and a deep-seated appreciation of—rather than rejection of—
legal doctrine. In brief, legal doctrine, at both the constitutional 
and subconstitutional level, is permeated with reasonableness 
and balancing tests and other doctrinal mechanisms that can-
not possibly be employed effectively unless judges are able to 
gain an empathic appreciation of the case from the perspective 
of all of the litigants. A judge can neither craft nor employ legal 
doctrine competently if she is not willing and able to understand 
the perspectives of, and the burdens upon, all of the parties. 
Part V then endeavors to illustrate the shortcomings of the 
model of non-empathic, umpire judging. It argues that a judge 
who believes in the popular portrait of judges as umpires, and 
who rejects as illegitimate calls for judicial empathy, will fail to 
realize that, while he thinks that he is simply calling objective 
balls and strikes, he is in fact unwittingly giving disproportion-
ate weight in his doctrinal calculus to the interests of those 
whose perspectives come most naturally to him. Finally, Part 
VI paints a portrait of the ideal empathic judge—a judge who 
has a talent for empathy and makes a conscious effort to empa-
thize with all parties, thus ensuring that she is not subcon-
sciously undervaluing the interests of those whose perspectives 
she does not instinctively appreciate. Part VI explains that, far 
from being the enemy of judicial neutrality, empathy is in fact 
necessary to impartial judging.  
I.  THE “UMPATHY” DIVIDE AND THE POVERTY OF 
POPULAR DISCOURSE ON JUDGING   
Over the five-year period from 2005 to 2010, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee held confirmation hearings for four Su-
preme Court nominees—a sudden flood of activity that followed 
more than a decade without a single high court vacancy. Some 
observers celebrated those events as a rare opportunity for the 
American public to give serious consideration to matters of ju-
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dicial philosophy.5 Alas, the opportunity, if there ever truly was 
one, was squandered. In the place of thoughtful dialogue and 
public education, the hearings presented the American people 
with maddeningly simplistic and vapid accounts of judicial de-
cision making. They pitted against each other two starkly con-
trasting visions of the role of the judge.6 On the right, we had 
the portrait, popularized by Chief Justice Roberts in his con-
firmation hearings, of the judge as detached umpire—simply 
calling balls and strikes, applying the law, rather than making 
it.7 On the left, we had the portrait, popularized by President 
Obama, of the engaged, empathic judge—whose decisions are 
influenced by a “quality of empathy, of understanding and 
identifying with people’s hopes and struggles.”8  
In the form in which they were received by the public, both 
portraits are clumsy and vacuous caricatures.9 And it is the 
conservatives who, it seems, have been most successful in shap-
ing the public’s understanding of both models. That is to say, 
conservatives have had considerable success in portraying the 
 
 5. See generally Dahlia Lithwick, Teach to America, SLATE (June 4, 2009, 
5:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/ 
06/teach_to_america.html. 
 6. As Matthew Frank put it, the “line between the Democrats and the 
Republicans” at these hearings “might be called the ‘umpathy’ line.” See The 
Federalist Society Online Debate Series: The Sotomayor Nomination, Part II, 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y (July 13, 2009), http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.30/ 
default.asp. 
 7. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. 
to be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing] (statement of 
John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules; 
they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure 
everybody plays by the rules. But it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a 
ball game to see the umpire.”). 
 8. Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs (May 1, 2009), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/press-briefing-press-secretary-robert 
-gibbs-5-1-09 (statement of President Obama).  
 9. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 5–8 (2007) (criticizing a popular 
discourse that presents judges as either nonpolitical umpires or purely ideo-
logical politicians); Francis J. Mootz III, Ugly American Hermeneutics, 10 NEV. 
L.J. 587, 588 (2010) (referring to this rhetoric as “ugly American hermeneu-
tics”); Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 26 J.L. & 
POL. 123, 125 (2011) ( lamenting the “legitimacy dichotomy”: “the notion that 
judges faced with constitutional disputes either behave in a democratically le-
gitimate manner by dutifully obeying the sovereign people’s constitutional in-
structions or behave in a democratically illegitimate manner by usurping the 
role of the sovereign people and imposing their own personal preferences on 
the rest of the nation”).  
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judicial selection process as a choice between conservative 
judges who dutifully and humbly follow the law without regard 
to their own personal preferences and liberal judges who bra-
zenly ignore or defy the law so as to rule out of personal sympa-
thy for their preferred groups.10 
Painting judging in this light obviously serves political 
goals, and perhaps does so quite effectively. But it undermines 
any serious attempt to educate the public about judicial deci-
sion making.11 On that score, neither of these portraits is in the 
least bit enlightening.  
 
 10. See Rollert, supra note 4, at 98 (noting that conservatives have suc-
ceeded in turning into “conventional wisdom” the “picture of liberal judges as 
rogue jurists who make up the law as they go along and conservative judges 
who act as humble clerks to the Founders and the legislative wisdom of the 
day”). Senator Jeff Sessions was a typical source of this rhetoric. See Confir-
mation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5–6 (2009) [hereinafter Sotomayor Hear-
ings] (Statement of Sen. Sessions) (portraying the Supreme Court selection 
process as a choice between “impartial and wise judges” who guide us to “ob-
jective truth” and a “Brave New World” in which “a judge is free to push his or 
her own political or social agenda”); The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Kagan Hearings] 
(remarks of Sen. Sessions) (“There are two views of the courts. One is the 
judge as a neutral umpire. The other view is that a judge should be activ-
ist . . . [and believe] that they have a right to advance a political agenda.”).  
Of course, when the choice is portrayed in these terms, the “correct” an-
swer is obvious. See THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, 2008 POST-ELECTION SURVEY 
OF 800 ACTUAL VOTERS, at 5 (2008), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/ 
20081105_PostElectionSurvey11408.pdf (presenting results of a 2008 survey 
that found that the public overwhelmingly prefers judges who “will interpret 
and apply the law as it is written and not take into account their own view-
points and experiences” over judges who “will go beyond interpreting and ap-
plying the law and take into account their own viewpoints and experiences”). 
If, however, a more charitable picture of the empathic judge is presented, the 
public is much more receptive. See Jamal Greene et al., Profiling Originalism, 
111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 366 (2011) (presenting results of a 2009 survey that 
found that fifty-nine percent of the public believes it to be either somewhat or 
very important for Supreme Court justices to “feel empathy for the people in-
volved in a case”); James L. Gibson, Expecting Justice and Hoping for Empa-
thy, PAC. STANDARD (June 20, 2010), http://www.miller-mccune.com/legal 
-affairs/expecting-justice-and-hoping-for-empathy-17677/ (presenting results of 
a 2009 survey that found that two-thirds of the public assigns the highest de-
gree of importance to a judge being “able to empathize with ordinary people—
that is, to be able to understand how the law hurts or helps the people,” and 
only eight percent rates this characteristic as entirely unimportant). 
 11. See Wardlaw, supra note 3, at 1630 (“Though much of the rhetoric 
about judges and judging has proven politically expedient for politicians and 
interest groups engaged in judicial confirmation fights, it has been a disservice 
to the American public and the federal judiciary.”).  
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The judge-as-umpire analogy has the potential to be nu-
anced and perhaps even edifying,12 and maybe Chief Justice 
Roberts meant to invoke a complicated concept.13 But the mes-
sage received by the public—and the Senate—lacked any such 
subtlety.14 Rather, the message came across that good judges 
(which is to say, conservative judges) decide all cases by simply 
following the law, mechanically calling balls and strikes accord-
ing to clear and determinative rules set down by the Framers 
and legislatures.15  
This bears virtually no resemblance to the actual process of 
judging. It should be difficult for any knowledgeable person to 
take seriously the claim that good, principled, “non-activist” 
judges never make law—that they, instead, simply act as um-
pires, discerning in every case the single, correct answer that is 
inexorably dictated by the governing legal authorities.16 As Er-
 
 12. See generally Michael P. Allen, A Limited Defense of (at Least Some of) 
the Umpire Analogy, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525 (2009); Theodore A. McKee, 
Judges as Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709 (2007).  
 13. See Roberts Hearing, supra note 7, at 205–06 (noting that judges bring 
their life experiences to the bench and that reasonable people can sometimes 
disagree about the proper answer to constitutional questions). 
 14. See Rollert, supra note 4, at 95 (“Listening to John Roberts, one might 
have wondered how the Supreme Court ever came to be so highly regarded. He 
made it sound as if the work of a Justice were no more complicated than as-
sembling a futon from Ikea, a task that most any person could do who had an 
aptitude for following directions and the patience of Job.”); Neil S. Siegel, Um-
pires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 702–
11 (2007); Wardlaw, supra note 3, at 1636 (“The judge-as-umpire construct es-
tablishes a false choice between the judge who calls balls and strikes, and 
nothing more, and the activist judge who behaves extrajudiciously.”). 
 15. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 
(2009) ( lamenting that “Senate confirmation hearings . . . bolster the popular 
fable that constitutional adjudication can be practiced in something close to an 
objective and mechanical fashion”). Louis Michael Seidman had little patience 
for Justice Sotomayor’s testimony to this effect at her confirmation hearings:  
How could someone who has been on the bench for seventeen years 
possibly believe that judging in hard cases involves no more than ap-
plying the law to the facts? First year law students understand within 
a month that many areas of the law are open textured and indetermi-
nate—that the legal material frequently . . . must be supplemented by 
contestable presuppositions, empirical assumptions, and moral judg-
ments. To claim otherwise—to claim that fidelity to uncontested legal 
principles dictates results—is to claim that whenever Justices disa-
gree among themselves, someone is either a fool or acting in bad faith. 
What does it say about our legal system that in order to get confirmed 
Judge Sotomayor must tell the lies that she told today? That judges and 
justices must live these lies throughout their professional carers [sic]? 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y, supra note 6.  
 16. See, e.g., James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears 
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win Chemerinsky has explained, “any first year law student 
knows that judges make law constantly. The first year stu-
dent’s common law subjects are almost entirely judge-made 
law. Interpretation of an ambiguous statute or a constitutional 
provision’s broad, open-textured language is also a judge’s legal 
product.”17 Surely “we are all realists now” in the simple sense 
 
were) as to be unaware that judges in a real sense ‘make’ law.”); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 78 (2008) (arguing that neither Chief Justice 
Roberts “nor any other knowledgeable person actually believed or believes that 
the rules that judges in our system apply, particularly appellate judges and 
most particularly the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, are given to them 
the way the rules of baseball are given to umpires”); Antonin Scalia, The Rule 
of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1989) (discussing and 
accepting the lawmaking role of judges); id. at 1181, 1186 (noting that when 
judges apply standards, rather than bright-line rules, “there is no single ‘right’ 
answer”).  
If I were a judicial nominee testifying before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, and a Senator asked me a question suggesting that principled judges 
always reach clear answers dictated by the law, I would be tempted to answer 
by pointing out that Justices Scalia and Thomas—the most favored Justices of 
the political right—disagreed in twenty cases in the last Term alone. See The 
Supreme Court, 2009 Term—The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411, 414 tbl.I 
(2010). “Senator,” I would ask, “which one of them is the principled judicial 
umpire, and which one is the hopeless judicial activist?” Justice Kagan came 
about as close as a nominee can realistically be expected to get to giving an 
answer along these lines when she testified as to the limits of the umpire 
analogy: 
I suppose the way in which I think that the metaphor does have its 
limits . . . [is] that the metaphor might suggest to some people that 
law is a kind of robotic enterprise, that there is a kind of automatic 
quality to it, that it is easy, that we just sort of stand there and, you 
know, we go ball and strike, and everything is clear-cut and that 
there is no judgment in the process. And I do think that that is not 
right, and it is especially not right at the Supreme Court level, where 
the hardest cases go and the cases that have been the subject of most 
dispute go. . . . [W]e do know that not every case is decided 9-0, and 
that is not because anybody is acting in bad faith. It is because those 
legal judgments are ones in which reasonable people can reasonably 
disagree sometimes. 
Kagan Hearings, supra note 10, at 203 (2010).  
 17. Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes: Recognizing the 
Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1069 (2006); 
see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE 
ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 91 (2010) (observing that “it was apparent to 
many that the law has inconsistencies, runs out, and routinely comes up 
against unanticipated situations and that judges possess a substantial degree 
of flexibility when working with legal materials”); Michael Abramowicz & 
Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 965, 1036 (2009) (“[E]ven those who rail against so-called ‘judicial activ-
ism’ now generally accept that judges sometimes make law. That reali-
ty . . . cannot be denied.”) (footnote omitted); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases 
Make Bad Law, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 888 (2006) (“[W]hether in the context 
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that any even remotely sophisticated student of law recognizes 
that the formal sources of law often do not dictate clear and un-
equivocal answers to the questions posed to judges.18 The popu-
lar judge-as-umpire portrait utterly fails to acknowledge the 
basic reality of judging.  
As for the other portrait—the empathic judge—
conservatives have largely succeeded in painting it in such 
spectacularly unflattering terms19 that the Democratic mem-
bers of the Judiciary Committee shied away from defending 
it,20 President Obama’s own Supreme Court nominees appeared 
to reject it,21 and even the President himself eventually backed 
off of it.22 “Empathy,” as observers of political discourse have 
noted, has “become code now for activist judge.”23  
 
of pure common law decisionmaking or instead in the context of the supposed 
‘interpretation’ of capacious language in statutes or the Constitution, it is far 
too late in the day to deny that judges are often . . . engaged in the process of 
making law.”).  
 18. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
165 (1921) (noting that there are cases in which the law does not dictate a 
clear answer); Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 50–51 
(2010); Pettys, supra note 9, at 124 (noting that “judges faced with constitu-
tional controversies often must choose from an array of conflicting—yet con-
ventionally permissible—interpretive options”). See generally Brian Leiter, Re-
thinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
267 (1997).  
 19. “By the time the Sotomayor hearings began, Republicans were united 
in their aim to put empathy on trial. In their opening statements, every Re-
publican member of the Senate Judiciary Committee singled out the term for 
abuse.” Rollert, supra note 4, at 92.  
 20. See id. at 90. 
 21. See Sotomayor Hearings, supra note 10, at 120 (“I don’t—wouldn’t ap-
proach the issue of judging in the way the President does.”); Wardlaw, supra 
note 3, at 1631 (“That one word became so politically charged that Supreme 
Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor went on record as distancing herself from the 
approach to judging espoused by the President.”); Kagan Disregards Obama 
View on Empathy, BLOG LEGALTIMES (June 29, 2010, 12:51 PM), http:// 
legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/06/kagan-disregards-obama-view-on-empathy 
.html (“As Justice Sonia Sotomayor did a year ago, Supreme Court nominee 
Elena Kagan backed away today from President Barack Obama’s statements 
about the role of empathy in judging.”). 
 22. See Rollert, supra note 4, at 90, 105 (noting that President Obama 
made no mention of empathy when Justice Stevens retired or when Justice 
Kagan was nominated); Wardlaw, supra note 3 (noting that “Sotomayor dis-
tanced herself from it; and the President, perhaps believing that discretion is 
the better part of valor, never repeated it”). 
 23. Transcript of American Morning, CNN.COM (July 14, 2009), http:// 
archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0907/14/ltm.03.html (remarks of CNN cor-
respondent Carol Costello); see also Rollert, supra note 4, at 92 (referring to 
empathy as “the Scarlet E”); Wardlaw, supra note 3, at 1631 (explaining that 
empathy “became a code word for judicial overreaching, and it served as the 
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According to many conservatives, liberals openly and una-
bashedly view judging as a purely political act. Accordingly, the 
only thing that liberals look for in a judge is an assurance that 
he or she will reach politically liberal results.24 As one commen-
tator sees it: 
For most liberal judges, the primary purpose of being a judge is to 
promote social justice and transform society. That is why liberal judg-
es are so much more likely to be judicial activists than conservative 
judges. Most liberal judges do not see their roles as merely adjudicating 
a dispute according to the law. They see their role primarily as using 
the law and their power to rule on the law to promote social justice.25 
Thus, claim conservatives, “as a general mat-
ter . . . political conservatives want non-ideological judges, not 
‘conservative’ ones, while political liberals want ideologically 
liberal judges.”26 
Those who ascribe to this cynical view of liberal judicial 
philosophy take President Obama’s call for judicial empathy as 
an acknowledgement of his preference for this approach—as a 
stunningly honest confession that he wants judges who will ig-
nore the law and instead decide cases in favor of minorities and 
the oppressed.27 They insist that, because “judging based on 
 
blank slate onto which politicians painted doomsday scenarios of a judiciary 
run amok”).  
 24. See, e.g., Rush Limbaugh, A Look Inside the Liberal Mind, 
RUSHLIMABUGH.COM (June 30, 2009), http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/ 
daily/site_063009/content/01125112.guest.html (“I think it’s time to forget 
holding out hope for liberal judges, folks. They are not like us. They don’t look 
at the judicial system the way we do. They don’t look at the law the way we 
do. . . . They don’t look at the law as a means of finding legal adjudications to 
cases [sic]. They look at the law and the court system as a way to level the 
playing field according to their view of how it’s unfair.”). 
 25. Dennis Prager, Why Reporters—and Judges and Professors—Are Bi-
ased, TOWNHALL (Nov. 25, 2008), http://townhall.com/columnists/DennisPrager/ 
2008/11/25/why_reporters_--_and_judges_and_professors_--_are_biased/page/full/. 
 26. Matthew J. Franck, Souter Vacancy I: Toward Armistice in the Judi-
cial Wars?, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 3, 2009, 4:29 PM), http://www 
.nationalreview.com/blogs/print/50214.  
 27. See, e.g., Rollert, supra note 4 (“To the Right, empathy was nothing 
less than a code word for judicial activism, a dog whistle to the Democratic 
base that the President would choose judges who would put the counsel of a 
bleeding heart above the demands of impartial justice.”); Karl Rove, Op-Ed., 
“Empathy” is Code for Judicial Activism, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2009, at A13 
(“‘Empathy’ is the latest code word for liberal activism, for treating the Consti-
tution as malleable clay to be kneaded and molded in whatever form justices 
want. It represents an expansive view of the judiciary in which courts create 
policy that couldn’t pass the legislative branch or, if it did, would generate vot-
er backlash.”); Editorial, After Souter, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 4, 2009, 4:00 
AM), http://article.nationalreview.com/393115/after-souter/the-editors (“Empa-
thy is simply a codeword for an inclination toward liberal activ-
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empathy is really just legislating from the bench,”28 President 
Obama’s empathy standard is “antithetical to the proper role of 
a judge.”29  
II.  THE VIEW OF EMPATHY AMONG CONSERVATIVE 
LEGAL INTELLECTUALS   
One might be tempted to speculate that these crude por-
traits, however much salience they might have with lay com-
mentators, politicians, and the general public,30 hold no sway 
over those who should know better.31 Perhaps this is all just 
dumbed-down political theater, and is recognized as such by se-
 
ism. . . . [President Obama] cares about getting another vote for liberal re-
sults.”); Gary Bauer, Commentary, An Ideological Choice, WASH. TIMES (May 
27, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/27/an-ideological 
-choice/ (“Mr. Obama has told us what kind of judges he is seeking: judges who 
feel unconstrained by the plain language of the law or the text of the Constitu-
tion, judges who instead will act on their ‘empathy,’ on their own sense of right 
and wrong. He wants judges who will legislate from the bench. That is the 
very definition of judicial activism.”); Transcript of Special Report With Bret 
Baier Panel on President Obama Replacing Justice Souter, FOXNEWS.COM 
(May 4, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,518880,00 
.html (remarks of Fred Barnes) (arguing that President Obama’s claim to be 
searching for a Justice who understands how law affects people’s lives is “what 
liberal judicial activism . . . is all about. It’s entirely results oriented”). 
 28. Sotomayor Hearings, supra note 10, at 17 (statement of Sen. Grassley).  
 29. Id. at 40 (statement of Sen. Coburn); see also id. at 6 (statement of 
Sen. Sessions) (“[O]ur system will only be further corrupted . . . as a result of 
President Obama’s views that, in tough cases, the critical ingredient for a 
judge is the ‘depth and breadth of one’s empathy.’”); Charles Krauthammer, 
Op-Ed., Sotomayor: Rebut, Then Confirm, WASH. POST, May 29, 2009, at A17 
(insisting that “conservatism . . . stands unequivocally against justice as em-
pathy”); Rich Lowry, A Bad Day for Impartiality, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 26, 
2009, 6:15 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/227584/bad-day 
-impartiality/rich-lowry (“Impartiality has been supplanted by empathy. The 
old-fashioned virtue of objectivity—redolent of dusty law books and the unro-
mantic task of parsing the law and facts—is giving way to an inherently politi-
cized notion of judging based on feelings. Lady Justice is to slip her blindfold 
and let her decisions be influenced by her life experiences and personal predi-
lections.”); Transcript of “This Week with George Stephanopoulos,” ABC (May 
3, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/story?id=7491153&page=1#.T1FQ0_ 
EgcUJ (remarks of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (dubbing empathy “a code word for an 
activist judge” and suggesting that empathic judges rule “on the basis of their 
personal politics, their personal feelings, their personal preferences”).  
 30. See Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Is-
sue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111, 112 (2010) (observing that “one might think the 
popular culture is the last preserve of vulgar formalism”).  
 31. Cf. TAMANAHA, supra note 17, at 197 (“No one thinks that law is au-
tonomous and judging is mechanical deduction, and rare is the informed jurist 
who thinks that judges are engaged in the single-minded pursuit of their per-
sonal preferences.”). 
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rious intellectuals of all stripes. But my impression is that 
many—though of course not all—conservative legal intellectu-
als do indeed believe a somewhat softened version of these 
claims. They do think that there are “correct” doctrinal answers 
to most of even the thorniest legal questions,32 and they doubt 
very much that liberals have any genuine interest in ascertain-
ing them.33 Viewed charitably, their line of reasoning would 
appear to be that liberals have been seduced by what might be 
called “vulgar realism”34 to believe that law is radically inde-
terminate, and thus that it must really be the judges’ political 
beliefs that decide cases.35 As such, liberals have given up on 
law, and they simply ask judges to be reliable liberal politi-
cians.36 When President Obama calls for empathy in judging, 
 
 32. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 
849, 863 (1989) (arguing that, for “the vast majority of questions the answer is 
clear”); Frederick Liu, Comment, The Supreme Court Appointments Process 
and the Real Divide Between Liberals and Conservatives, 117 YALE L.J. 1947, 
1951 (2008) (“Judicial conservatives believe that traditional legal authorities—
text, history, and structure—rarely run out; the law almost always yields a 
single right answer.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of 
Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 283 (1995) (arguing that liberals 
believe that fundamental questions of public policy should be decided by “the 
Justices of the Supreme Court, guided only by their own notions (or those of 
some professor or clerk) of what is good for the country”); cf. Lee Renzin, Note, 
Advice, Consent, and Senate Inaction—Is Judicial Resolution Possible?, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1739, 1746 (1998) (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“‘We have liberal 
activists who ignore what the law is, don’t care what the law is.’”).  
 34. See Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discre-
tion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 728 (1997).  
 35. See Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, “Tenured” Lawyers, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 88 (1998) (“We live in a post-Legal Realist Age, when 
most legal commentators take it for granted that law cannot be disentangled 
from politics and that legal judgment is driven by the political beliefs of the 
decisionmaker.”); Pettys, supra note 9, at 130 (noting that many second- and 
third-year law students “believe that litigators often cite what they describe as 
‘authorities’ in order to try to shape the judge’s preferences—but at the end of 
the day, the judge’s preferences are what centrally matter”); Suzanna Sherry, 
Putting the Law Back in Constitutional Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 461, 461–
65 (2009) ( lamenting the extent to which this belief has pervaded the legal 
academy). Likewise, the attitudinalist political science literature has been 
characterized by a tendency to view judicial opinions as merely the product of 
the judge’s politics, see Sherry, supra, at 461–62, and to view law professors as 
hopelessly naive for continuing to pay attention to legal doctrine, see H. Jeffer-
son Powell, A Response to Professor Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right 
Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1725, 1725 (2009). 
 36. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S6603 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2010) (remarks of 
Sen. Sessions) (attributing future Justice Kagan’s judicial views to the fact 
that “many liberal activists in America have lost faith in the idea of objectivi-
ty, which means they have lost faith in the reality of objective truth, the find-
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he simply means that politician-judges should be good liberals 
and favor the sympathetic little guy.  
Sentiments along these lines have been expressed by con-
servative commentators with serious legal credentials37 and by 
conservative judges and law professors.38 Steven Calabresi, for 
instance, summarizes President Obama’s “extreme left-wing 
views about the role of judges. He believes—and he is quite 
open about this—that judges ought to decide cases in light of 
the empathy they ought to feel for the little guy in any law-
suit.”39 Obama’s view is that “[e]mpathy, not justice, ought to 
be the mission of the federal courts, and the redistribution of 
wealth should be their mantra.”40 Which means, in turn, that 
Obama’s emphasis on empathy in essence requires the appointment 
of judges committed in advance to violating [their] oath. To the tradi-
tional view of justice as a blindfolded person weighing legal claims 
 
ing of which—the finding of truth—has been the goal, the central focus of the 
American legal system since its creation”); EISGRUBER, supra note 9, at 7–8 
(attributing an approach much like this one to Sen. Charles Schumer). 
 37. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Barack Obama: The Present is Prologue, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 7, 2008, at A22 (quoting Theodore Olson, former Solicitor General 
of the United States) (claiming that President Obama “is looking for someone 
who would make judicial decisions based upon emotions and sympathy and 
picking the underdog, rather than applying the law”); Wendy E. Long, Op-Ed., 
Opening of a Sorry Chapter, WASH. TIMES, May 4, 2009, at A21 (deriding “em-
pathy” as a “lawless standard of partiality”); Lithwick, supra note 5 (noting 
remarks of Ed Whelan, former law clerk to Justice Scalia, former principal 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel of the Jus-
tice Department, and former General Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee) (claiming that liberals “see[ ] no meaningful constraints on interpretive 
methodologies and look[ ] to the Supreme Court to pave the way to a progres-
sive future by inventing a continuing series of new rights”); Jessie Weiser, De-
fine Empathy, RELIGIOUS ACTION CENTER BLOG (May 21, 2009), http://blogs 
.rj.org/rac/2009/05/21/define_empathy (quoting Wendy Long, former law clerk 
to Justice Thomas) (“Lady Justice doesn’t have empathy for anyone. She rules 
strictly based upon the law and that’s really the only way that our system can 
function properly under the Constitution.”); Edward Whelan, Obama’s Consti-
tution, WEEKLY STANDARD (March 17, 2008), http://www.weeklystandard.com/ 
print/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/849oyckg.asp (“No clearer prescrip-
tion for lawless judicial activism [than President Obama’s call for empathy] is 
possible”); id. (“So much for the judicial virtue of dispassion. So much for the 
craft of judging that is distinct from politics.”).  
 38. For a good place to start for the view among some conservative law 
professors that liberals want judges to ignore the law, see generally Lino A. 
Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631 (1993). 
 39. Steven G. Calabresi, Op-Ed., Obama’s “Redistribution” Constitution, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2008, at A17. 
 40. Id. 
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fairly on a scale, he wants to tear the blindfold off, so the judge can 
rule for the party he empathizes with most.41 
In welcome contrast to these overblown fusillades, my col-
league, Orin Kerr, has offered a significantly more sophisticat-
ed take on President Obama’s call for empathic judges. In an 
extended blog post, Kerr suggests that, to understand what 
President Obama means by empathy, “we need to recognize the 
important but usually overlooked differences in how different 
people understand the role of ambiguity in judicial 
decisionmaking.”42 Kerr notes “that there is a sliding scale be-
tween cases where the relevant legal materials point to an ab-
solute answer and cases where there is a tougher call to make,” 
and he opines that, when it comes to cases at the latter end of 
the scale, “there are two different ways to deal with this kind of 
legal ambiguity.”43 The first “approach is to see legal ambiguity 
as cause for judicial weighing. This view sees the role of the 
judge as narrow.”44 On this view, the  
judge must weigh the best legal arguments on one side and the best 
legal arguments for the other, and must pick the side that has the 
better of it, no matter how slight the advantage. If a case is 55/45, 
[then] there is a correct answer, because 55 is greater than 45.45  
 
 41. Id.; see also Lino A. Graglia, Birthright Citizenship for Children of Il-
legal Aliens: An Irrational Public Policy, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 11 (2009) 
(“Justice Brennan never let law, fact, or logic stand in the way of a decision he 
wanted to reach. He agreed with President Barack Obama that the function of 
the court was to decide challenging cases on the basis of ‘empathy.’” (footnote 
omitted)); Thomas B. Griffith, Was Bork Right About Judges?, 34 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 157, 159–62 (2011) (arguing that many liberal intellectuals believe 
that judges should be results oriented rather than neutral); id. at 162–63 
(suggesting that President Obama’s call for empathy in judging “will lead a 
judge to side with the disadvantaged . . . in the face of law that requires a dif-
ferent outcome”); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Subjective Art; Objective Law, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1663, 1664 (2010) (arguing that “evocations of judicial 
empathy” are indicative of judges who engage in “freewheeling adjudication” 
and give into temptation “to do justice as they feel it should be done rather 
than adhering to the strictures of text and structure”); id. at 1676 (arguing 
that empathy “has no place in judging”); id. at 1678 (arguing that “it requires 
a certain chutzpah . . . to assert that empathy . . . should be used by judges in 
reaching legal determinations”); John Yoo, Empathy Triumphs Over Excel-
lence, ENTERPRISE BLOG (May 26, 2009, 1:03 PM), http://blog.american 
.com/2009/05/empathy-triumphs-over-excellence/ (suggesting that then-Judge 
Sotomayor decided cases on the basis of her “‘empathy’ rather than a correct 
reading of the Constitution”).  
 42. Orin Kerr, Legal Ambiguity, Empathy, and the Role of Judicial Power, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 13, 2009, 5:51 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/05/13/ 
legal-ambiguity-empathy-and-the-role-of-judicial-power/. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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The other approach, by contrast, “is to see legal ambiguity as 
cause for judicial empowerment.”46 On this alternative view, 
the judge must “dutifully follow[] the law when the law is clear. 
But as soon as there is some ambiguity, and the law is unclear, 
then the judge is free to decide the case however he wants.”47 
There is no need “for a case to be truly 50/50” for the judge to 
follow her own preferences.48  
So long as there is some appreciable legal ambiguity, there is no clear 
“correct” answer. Maybe 70/30 is enough, or maybe even 75/25 will do. 
Either way, the lack of a “correct” answer means that the judge can 
rule in a way that furthers whatever normative vision of the law that 
the judge happens to like.49 
Kerr opines that President Obama’s statements about em-
pathy indicate that he “is in the latter camp: He sees legal am-
biguity as a cause for judicial empowerment. He believes that 
when there is legal ambiguity, a judge is then free to make the 
decision he wants.”50 Thus,  
Obama sees empathy as critical because he thinks that judges in close 
cases have a free choice as to which side should win. A substantial 
number of the close cases that reach the Supreme Court involve some 
sort of power dynamic—employer versus employee, plaintiff versus 
big company—and Obama wants the judge who will pick the side of 
the powerless.51 
In its nuance, this interpretation is certainly more charita-
ble to the President than other recent critiques of empathy in 
judging have typically been. Yet it still boils down to an asser-
tion that, in some meaningful category of important cases (in-
deed, the most important and most difficult cases), judges of 
the sort favored by the President self-consciously choose politi-
cally desirable results over legally stronger arguments. In the 
hardest of cases, conservative judges do their best to follow the 
law regardless of their policy preferences, whereas empathic 
judges consciously ignore or override their own sense of the 
stronger legal argument in favor of their policy preferences.52 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. In fairness to Kerr, he goes out of his way to point out that this “view 
of the judicial power isn’t necessarily conservative or liberal; it is very much 
the view of Richard Posner, who envisions that position as a ‘realist’ and 
‘pragmatist’ view.” Id. 
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If even Orin Kerr—as thoughtful and fair-minded a con-
servative public intellectual as they come—thinks that this is 
what liberals are looking for in an empathic judge, then liberals 
need to do a much better job of explaining themselves.  
III.  THE NATURE OF EMPATHY   
In order to defend empathy, we must first define it. We 
could easily get bogged down at this first step, for the meaning 
of “empathy” is surprisingly elusive. The word is relatively new 
to the English language, and for many years the science and 
social science literature has struggled to agree upon a defini-
tion.53 But for our purposes, the dictionary definition should do 
fine.54 Empathy is “the action of understanding, being aware of, 
being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, 
thoughts, and experience of another of either the past or pre-
sent without having the feelings, thoughts, and experience fully 
communicated in an objectively explicit manner; also: the ca-
pacity for this.”55 
That is to say, empathy involves the cognitive skill of per-
spective taking—the ability to see a situation from someone 
else’s perspective—combined with the emotional capacity to 
understand and feel that person’s emotions in that situation.56  
 
 53. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. MORRELL, EMPATHY AND DEMOCRACY: FEELING, 
THINKING, AND DELIBERATION 39–66 (2010); Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic 
Judging and the Rule of Law, 2009 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 133, 134 (noting 
that “empathy is a term with no fixed meaning”); Justin D’Arms, Empathy 
and Evaluative Inquiry, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1467, 1477 (2000) (“Though 
‘empathy’ is a relatively recent term in English, it has already become ambig-
uous.”); Darrell A.H. Miller, Iqbal and Empathy, 78 UMKC L. REV. 999, 1009 
(2010) (noting that scholars have used the term “empathy” to denote a number 
of different concepts); Bert S. Moore, The Origins and Development of Empa-
thy, 14 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 75, 76 (1990); Frederique de Vignemont & 
Tania Singer, The Empathic Brain: How, When and Why?, 10 TRENDS COGNI-
TIVE SCI. 435, 435 (2006) (“There are probably nearly as many definitions of 
empathy as people working on the topic.”); Lauren Wispé, History of the Con-
cept of Empathy, in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 17, 17–37 (Nancy Eisen-
berg & Janet Strayer eds., 1987).  
 54. Then-Senator (and presidential candidate) Obama once wrote in a let-
ter to a child, “If you don’t already know what it means, I want you to look up 
the word ‘empathy’ in the dictionary. I believe we don’t have enough empathy 
in our world today, and it is up to your generation to change that.” Doreen Yu, 
Pinay Girl Writes to Obama, Gets Response, PHILIPPINE STAR (Nov. 7, 2008, 
12:00 AM), http://www.philstar.com/article.aspx?articleid=413244.  
 55. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 408 (11th ed. 2003). 
 56. The psychology literature emphasizes that true empathy goes beyond 
perspective taking; there is a necessary component of emotional engagement. 
See, e.g., Frans B.M. de Waal, Putting the Altruism Back into Altruism: The 
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Empathy does not, then, dictate or even imply a propensity 
to act in any particular way, or to favor any particular group. 
“Empathy is first and foremost a capacity. Strictly speaking, it 
is value-free. . . . What one does with the insight provided by 
empathic understanding” is a separate inquiry from whether or 
not one is capable of empathizing.57 By the same token, empa-
thy is manifestly not the same thing as sympathy. To sympa-
thize is to feel for someone; to empathize is to feel with them.58 
“[W]hen you feel sympathy for another with a problem, you do 
not actually experience emotions parallel to their’s [sic]; in-
stead, you experience different emotions that are associated 
with concern or sorrow for another.”59 To empathize with oth-
ers, by contrast, is not to feel sorry for them or to feel a need to 
help them; it is simply to understand things from their perspec-
tive and to be able to sense what they are feeling.60 Virtually 
everyone experiences empathy; humans are hard-wired to em-
 
Evolution of Empathy, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 279, 285 (2008) (finding per-
spective-taking is only empathy in combination with emotional engagement); 
Nancy Eisenberg & Janet Strayer, Critical Issues in the Study of Empathy, in 
EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT, supra note 53, at 3, 5 (noting empathy re-
quires sharing perceived emotions or “feeling with” another). “Empa-
thy . . . requires not only that you can identify another person’s feelings and 
thoughts, but that you respond to these with an appropriate emotion too.” 
SIMON BARON-COHEN, ZERO DEGREES OF EMPATHY 11 (2011). 
 57. Michael Franz Basch, Empathic Understanding: A Review of the Con-
cept and Some Theoretical Considerations, 31 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS’N 
101, 119, 123 (1983). 
 58. See, e.g., Jean Decety & Kalina J. Michalska, Neurodevelopmental 
Changes in the Circuits Underlying Empathy and Sympathy from Childhood 
to Adulthood, 13 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 886, 886 (2010) (noting that it is im-
portant to “distinguish between empathy (the ability to appreciate the emo-
tions and feelings of others with a minimal distinction between self and other) 
and sympathy (feelings of concern about the welfare of others)”); Darrick 
Jolliffe & David P. Farrington, Development and Validation of the Basic Em-
pathy Scale, 29 J. ADOLESCENCE 589, 591 (2006) (noting that sympathy and 
empathy “are distinct and separate constructs” because empathy involves 
“emotion congruence” whereas “sympathy involves the appraisal of how one 
feels about the emotions of another”). 
 59. Nadine R. Richendoller & James B. Weaver III, Exploring the Links 
Between Personality and Empathic Response Style, 17 PERSONALITY & INDI-
VIDUAL DIFFERENCES 303, 304 (1994).  
 60. See Vignemont & Singer, supra note 53; cf. Bandes, supra note 53, at 
136 (“Empathy is a capacity, not an emotion. It differs from sympathy or com-
passion . . . . Empathy does not require, or necessarily lead to, sympathy.”); 
D’Arms, supra note 53, at 1479 (noting that “sympathy is an emotion, empa-
thy is a way of acquiring an emotion”).  
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pathize.61 Indeed, the complete inability to do so is the defining 
characteristic of a psychopath.62  
IV.  THE IMPORTANCE OF EMPATHY IN JUDGING   
Judge Richard Posner has suggested that, when it comes to 
judging, “the internal perspective—the putting oneself in the 
other person’s shoes—that is achieved by the exercise of empa-
thetic imagination lacks normative significance.”63 It seems 
that a great many lawyers, judges, and legal academics would 
tend to agree. After all, the “popular image of lawyers is that 
we are committed to formal rationality. We are trained to cabin 
‘empathic’ responses and remain steadfast in our commitment 
to legal principles despite emotional dissonance.”64 The object of 
this Article is to establish that, when properly understood, em-
pathy is an essential tool of an effective judge. The argument in 
support of that assertion unfolds in four steps that cut progres-
sively deeper into both the nature of judging and the nature of 
empathy.  
 
 61. See de Waal, supra note 56; Robert Plutchik, Evolutionary Bases of 
Empathy, in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT, supra note 53, at 38, 38–46 
(discussing the use of empathy in the evolution and survival of animals and 
humans); Stephanie D. Preston & Frans B.M. de Waal, Empathy: Its Ultimate 
and Proximate Bases, 25 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 9–14 (2002).  
 62. See ROBERT L. KATZ, EMPATHY: ITS NATURE AND USES 58 (1963); 
Tania Singer, The Neuronal Basis of Empathy and Fairness, in EMPATHY AND 
FAIRNESS 20, 20 (Greg Bock & Jamie Goode eds., 2007) (noting a lack of empa-
thy defines psychopaths who can hurt others guilt-free). Simon Baron-Cohen 
explains that persons with zero empathy tend to fall into one of two categories. 
The first includes those with autism or Asperger’s syndrome; they have no 
empathy, but they tend to follow the law and behave “super-morally” as a 
product of their “systemising” nature. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 
65–84. The second includes those with pathological conditions like borderline 
personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and narcissistic personal-
ity disorder; they are likely to harm others and are utterly unmoved by the 
pain and misery that they visit upon others. See id. at 29–64.  
 63. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 381 (1995). But see POSNER, 
supra note 16, at 117 ( listing “empathy” as component of judgment, to which 
judges must turn when the law is not clear).  
 64. Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: 
New Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2103 (1989). 
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A. THE INITIAL CUT: EMPATHY IN JUDGING MEANS SEEING (AND 
UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECT OF) THE ISSUE FROM ALL SIDES 
President Obama has never spelled out in detail the role 
that he intends empathy to play in judicial decision making.65 
Indeed, some feel that he has sent conflicting signals in this re-
gard.66 But, it is nonetheless possible to distill from his state-
ments a basic vision of judicial empathy.67  
In explaining his vote against Chief Justice Roberts, then-
Senator Obama declared that “adherence to legal precedent 
and rules of statutory or constitutional construction will dis-
pose of 95 percent of the cases that come before a court, so that 
both a Scalia and a Ginsburg will arrive at the same place most 
of the time on those 95 percent of the cases.”68 But in the other 
five percent,  
adherence to precedent and rules of construction and interpretation 
will only get you through the 25th mile of the marathon. That last 
mile can only be determined on the basis of one’s deepest values, one’s 
core concerns, one’s broader perspectives on how the world works, and 
the depth and breadth of one’s empathy. . . .  
 
In those circumstances, your decisions about whether affirmative ac-
tion is an appropriate response to the history of discrimination in this 
country or whether a general right of privacy encompasses a more 
specific right of women to control their reproductive decisions or 
whether the commerce clause empowers Congress to speak on those 
issues of broad national concern that may be only tangentially related 
 
 65. See Rollert, supra note 4, at 92–93 (arguing that no one at the 
Sotomayor confirmation hearings really knew what President Obama meant 
when he said that empathy is an essential ingredient in judicial decision  
making). 
 66. See Kathryn Abrams, Empathy and Experience in the Sotomayor 
Hearings, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 263, 266 (2010) (noting that some of President 
Obama’s statements about empathy “included a taxonomy of the kinds of posi-
tions with which a judge should be able to empathize,” but other statements 
indicated that “Obama’s ideal of judicial empathy seems more comprehensive 
in its reach and less specific in its targets”); id. at 275 (“President Obama’s 
discussions of empathy, in fact, fluctuated between those that highlighted un-
derstanding of particular groups and those that highlighted a posture that 
sought to understand the concrete life circumstances of the many kinds of liti-
gants who come before the Supreme Court.”). 
 67. A tremendous resource in this regard is a website maintained by The 
Center for Building a Culture of Empathy that purports to collect all of Presi-
dent Obama’s statements on empathy, in both text and video form. See CEN-
TER FOR BUILDING CULTURE EMPATHY, http://cultureofempathy.com/ 
Obama/VideoClips.htm ( last visited Feb. 28, 2012) [hereinafter CULTURE OF 
EMPATHY]. 
 68. 151 CONG. REC. S10,366 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Obama). 
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to what is easily defined as interstate commerce, whether a person 
who is disabled has the right to be accommodated so they can work 
alongside those who are nondisabled—in those difficult cases, the crit-
ical ingredient is supplied by what is in the judge’s heart.69 
In fairness, these remarks are perhaps naturally read to 
support Professor Kerr’s view that, in the President’s mind, se-
lective empathy for the downtrodden should be the decisive fac-
tor in cases where the law is not clear.70 And, independent of 
President Obama, some liberals who have called for empathy in 
judging seem to have endorsed that very sentiment.71  
But one can call for empathy in judging without making 
such a radical claim, and I believe that that is what President 
Obama meant to do.72 Some years later, in explaining the crite-
ria that would guide his search for a replacement for Justice 
Souter, President Obama declared: 
I will seek someone who understands that justice isn’t about some ab-
stract legal theory or footnote in a case book; it is also about how our 
laws affect the daily realities of people’s lives—whether they can 
make a living and care for their families; whether they feel safe in 
their homes and welcome in their own nation. I view that quality of 
empathy, of understanding and identifying with people’s hopes and 
struggles, as an essential ingredient for arriving a[t] just decisions 
and outcomes.73 
There is nothing in this statement that implies that the 
President was searching for a judge who empathizes only with 
groups favored by the political left. The President appeared to 
reference not only the poor (“whether they can make a living 
and care for their families”) and immigrants and minorities 
(“whether they feel . . . welcome in their own nation”), but also 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. See also Carrie Dann, Obama on Judges, Supreme Court, FIRST READ 
(July 17, 2007, 7:21 PM) http://firstread.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2007/07/17/ 
4439758-obama-on-judges-supreme-court (quoting remarks made by then-
Senator Obama at a July 17, 2007, Planned Parenthood conference) (“We need 
somebody who’s got the heart, the empathy, to recognize what it’s like to be a 
young teenage mom. The empathy to understand what it’s like to be poor, or 
African-American, or gay, or disabled, or old. And that’s the criteria by which 
I’m going to be selecting my judges.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Teresa Bruce, The Empathy Principle, 6 LAW & SEXUALITY 
REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 109, 111–13 (1996); see Massaro, supra 
note 64, at 2113 (arguing that “the empathy discourse implies a political and 
ethical agenda, which involves making choices among competing values or sets 
of feeling” and “represents a hope that certain specific, different and previous-
ly disenfranchised voices . . . will be heard, and will prevail”). 
 72. Cf. Kenji Yoshino, On Empathy in Judgment (Measure for Measure), 
57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 683, 700 (2009) (“The President has never advocated a 
model of pure empathy devoid of law.”). 
 73. Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, supra note 8. 
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actual and potential crime victims (“whether they feel safe in 
their homes”)—a group that in recent years tends to draw more 
empathy from conservatives than from liberals.74 Indeed, sev-
eral years earlier, President Obama had written that “empa-
thy . . . calls us all to task, the conservative and the liberal, the 
powerful and the powerless, the oppressed and the oppressor. 
We are all shaken out of our complacency. We are all forced be-
yond our limited vision.”75 And in an interview with Oprah 
Winfrey, he had said that “[e]mpathy doesn’t just extend to 
cute little kids. You have to have empathy when you’re talking 
to some guy who doesn’t like black people.”76 
Recall that empathy is not sympathy77—a point that Presi-
dent Obama himself has made repeatedly.78 Empathy is not 
compassion for the oppressed, or for anyone else, for that mat-
ter. Nor is it the capacity to feel the emotions of only the down-
trodden. It is, rather, the capacity to understand the perspec-
tive and feel the emotions of others—all others. President 
Obama has reiterated many times that he understands the 
“basic idea of empathy” to be exactly that: the ability to “imag-
ine standing in [others’] shoes, imagine looking through their 
 
 74. See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. 
REV. 937, 942–53 (1985) (discussing the role of victims in American law). 
 75. BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 68 (2006). 
 76. Oprah Talks to Barack Obama, O, OPRAH MAG., Nov. 2004, at 248, 
available at http://www.oprah.com/world/Oprah-Winfrey-Interviews-Barack 
-Obama/9. Thus, President Obama insists not only on “depth . . . of . . . empathy” 
but also on “breadth of . . . empathy.” 151 CONG. REC. S10,366 (daily ed. Sept. 
22, 2005) (statement of Sen. Obama); cf. President Barack Obama, Remarks at 
Student Roundtable, Istanbul, Turkey (Apr. 7, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-Of-President-Barack-Obama 
-At-Student-Roundtable-In-Istanbul) (“In the Muslim world, this notion that 
somehow everything is the fault of the Israelis lacks balance—because there’s 
two sides to every question. That doesn’t mean that sometimes one side has 
done something wrong and should not be condemned. But it does mean there’s 
always two sides to an issue. I say the same thing to my Jewish friends, which 
is you have to see the perspective of the Palestinians. Learning to stand in 
somebody else’s shoes to see through their eyes, that’s how peace begins.”); 
Newshour with Jim Leher: President Barack Obama Is Interviewed (PBS tele-
vision broadcast Dec. 23, 2009) (“[O]ne of the things that I think Democrats 
and Republicans have to constantly do is try to put themselves in the other 
person’s shoes.”). 
 77. See supra Part III. 
 78. See, e.g., OBAMA, supra note 75, at 66 (“[E]mpathy . . . is at the heart 
of my moral code, and it is how I understand the Golden Rule—not simply as a 
call to sympathy or charity, but as something more demanding, a call to stand 
in somebody else’s shoes and see through their eyes.”); Barack Obama, Here’s 
What It Takes to be a ‘Full-grown’ Man, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2005, at 27 (quot-
ing Obama’s Father’s Day remarks in 2005) (“Not sympathy, empathy.”).  
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eyes.”79 A judge who exercises the ability to empathize will 
surely do so with the poor, the weak, and the little guy. But she 
will also empathize with the rich, the powerful, and the big 
guy. An empathic judge will understand the perspective of both 
the innocent man who was mistakenly detained by the police 
and the police officer who had to make a snap judgment when 
lives appeared to be at risk. She will understand the perspec-
tive of both the aggrieved insured who was denied coverage for 
her loss and the skeptical claims adjustor who was concerned 
with avoiding fraud and containing costs. She will understand 
the perspective of both the dying patient who was misdiagnosed 
and the doctor who was rightly concerned with the costs and 
risks of ordering additional tests.  
Empathy in judging centers on an ability to truly under-
stand the human dimension of the case—the effects of the 
judge’s ruling on all of the people who will be affected by it. 
President Obama’s point is not that judges should ignore law in 
favor of sympathy, but rather that the ability to render justice 
necessitates not only an ability to grapple with complex legal 
theories and dense technical footnotes, but also an ability to 
“understand[] and identify[] with people’s”—all people’s—
“hopes and struggles.”80 
B. THE SECOND CUT: THE PERVASIVE NECESSITY TO 
UNDERSTAND THE PERSPECTIVES OF ALL SIDES IN JUDGING 
Why is that so? Why must a judge be able to understand 
and identify with people’s hopes and struggles in order to accu-
rately dispense justice? The answer to that question circles 
back to the bankruptcy of the popular judge-as-umpire analo-
 
 79. CULTURE OF EMPATHY, supra note 67 (scroll down to “2008-08-16-
Barack Obama Promotes Empathy: Saddleback Civil Forum Presidency”) (quot-
ing then-Senator Obama’s remarks from an election forum on August 16, 2008). 
 80. Press Briefing by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, supra note 8; see 
Douglas W. Kmiec, The Case for Empathy, AMERICA MAG. (May 11, 2009), 
http://www.americamagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=11649 (noting 
that “one can be empathetic toward all sides of a dispute”); Dahlia Lithwick, 
Once More, Without Feeling, SLATE (May 11, 2009, 7:15 PM), http://www.slate 
.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/05/once_more_without_feel
ing.html (“Empathy in a judge does not mean stopping midtrial to tenderly 
clutch the defendant to your heart and weep. It doesn’t mean reflexively giving 
one class of people an advantage over another because their lives are sad or 
difficult. When the president talks about empathy, he talks not of legal out-
comes but of an intellectual and ethical process: the ability to think about the 
law from more than one perspective.”). 
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gy.81 If the law really were objectively determinate in every 
case, and if judging really were a mechanical exercise, then 
empathy would have very little role to play in good judging.82 A 
computer would be the perfect judge, and computers cannot 
empathize.  
But the law is not mechanical; judging requires judgment. 
And judgment requires empathy. To understand why, we must 
explore the nature of the legal doctrine that judges are called 
upon to apply.  
Susan Bandes, a pioneer in thinking about empathy and 
the law, has opined that a “judge uses empathy as a tool toward 
understanding conflicting claims. Empathy assists the judge in 
understanding the litigants’ perspectives. It does not help re-
solve the legal issue of which litigant ought to prevail.”83 I disa-
gree. Empathy does help resolve the legal issue of which liti-
gant ought to prevail, because the legal question at issue often 
cannot be answered without understanding the way in which 
the litigants will be impacted by the decision. 
This basic notion is embedded in the very foundation of our 
legal system. The entire common law system of judging is 
premised on the assumption that “making law in the context of 
deciding particular cases produces lawmaking superior to the 
methods that ignore the importance of real litigants exemplify-
ing the issues the law must resolve.”84 When it comes to the 
federal courts in particular, one of the “‘implicit policies embod-
ied in Article III’”85 is that requiring a genuine case or contro-
versy “tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the 
court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debat-
ing society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a real-
istic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”86 That 
 
 81. See supra Part I. 
 82. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Op-Ed., Our Fill-in-the-Blank Constitution, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2010, at A27 (“If all judges did was umpire, then judicial 
empathy would be irrelevant.”). 
 83. Bandes, supra note 53, at 137. 
 84. Schauer, supra note 17, at 883. Indeed, the common law system is 
centered around the concept of reasoning by analogy, and a judge cannot de-
termine whether one litigant or injury is sufficiently like another without be-
ing able to empathize with each litigant. See Robin West, The Anti-Empathic 
Turn, NOMOS (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 2–4), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1885079. 
 85. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church 
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 
96 (1968)). 
 86. Id. 
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is to say, Article III’s case or controversy requirement—and the 
justiciability doctrines of standing, mootness, ripeness, and the 
rule against advisory opinions that stem from it—are grounded 
in substantial part in the notion that real-world context mat-
ters. Judges should not decide legal and constitutional issues in 
the abstract because they will arrive at better answers if they 
have a genuine appreciation of the ways in which the law af-
fects real people.  
Indeed, across the broad spectrum of constitutional law 
(and, more generally still, all law), the legal doctrine that has 
been built upon this foundation requires judges to gain an em-
pathic appreciation of the case from the perspective of all of the 
litigants.  
1. Constitutional Law 
Let us begin with an obvious recent example.87 In Safford 
Unified School District v. Redding, the Supreme Court was 
called upon to determine “whether a 13-year-old student’s 
Fourth Amendment right was violated when she was subjected 
to a search of her bra and underpants by school officials acting 
on reasonable suspicion that she had brought forbidden pre-
scription and over-the-counter drugs to school.”88 Under estab-
lished Fourth Amendment doctrine, determining the constitu-
tionality of searches by school officials requires “a careful 
balancing of governmental and private interests”; a school 
search “will be permissible in its scope when the measures 
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search 
and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the 
student and the nature of the infraction.”89 Thus, in order to re-
solve the constitutional issue, the Justices had to ascertain the 
extent to which the search was “intrusive” to the student. To do 
that, they needed to be able to empathize with her—to under-
stand how the search would have felt to her and the impact 
that it would have had upon her. In an interview, Justice Gins-
burg said that she had been worried that her all-male col-
leagues would not be up to the task. “They have never been a 
13-year-old girl,” she lamented. “It’s a very sensitive age for a 
 
 87. See Bandes, supra note 53, at 143–44 (discussing this example). 
 88. 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2637 (2009). 
 89. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985). 
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girl. I didn’t think that my colleagues, some of them, quite  
understood.”90  
Resolving the Fourth Amendment issue also required the 
Justices to empathize with the school administrators who or-
dered the search. One cannot, after all, “balanc[e] governmen-
tal and private interests”91 without a full appreciation of the 
extent of the government’s interest. Thus, at oral argument, 
Justice David H. Souter tried to see the case from the perspec-
tive of the school principal: 
The principal says, I know as a matter of reliable fact that one stu-
dent got sick, violently sick, within the past week or so on some pill; 
we don’t know exactly what it was. We also know within a reasonable 
period of time from where we are now that there have been kids who 
died from ingesting dangerous drugs. I’ve got suspicion that some 
drug is on this kid’s person. My thought process is I would rather 
have the kid embarrassed by a strip search . . . than to have some 
other kids dead because the stuff is distributed at lunchtime and 
things go awry. . . . Is that thought process, that reasoning, the basis 
for a . . . reasonable strip search?92 
Only after seeking to fully understand the impact of the search, 
or of a decision not to search, on all of the relevant parties, could 
the Court determine whether the search was constitutional.  
Accordingly, this was not a case of the Justices choosing 
empathy over the law. It was instead a case of the Justices us-
ing the essential tool of empathy in order to determine the 
proper application of the law to the facts at hand. The Court 
could not possibly have done a good job in deciding which party 
should win under the law without first seeking to understand 
the perspective of each party. Failure to do so—to fully and 
successfully empathize with either the student or the adminis-
trator—could have resulted in a bad decision. To understand 
and appreciate the student’s interest, but not the principal’s, or 
vice versa, would be to give insufficient weight to one side of 
the scale, which would improperly tip the balance in favor of 
one party or the other, quite possibly in a dispositive manner.  
 
 90. Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY, 
(Oct. 5, 2009, 11:16 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/ 
2009-05-05-ruthginsburg_N.htm. 
 91. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 
 92. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–49, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479), 2009 WL 1064200 (question of 
Justice Souter). 
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This same point can be made about virtually any Fourth 
Amendment case, as the Fourth Amendment necessitates this 
sort of empathic balancing.93 
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the 
reasonableness of a search is determined by assessing, on the one 
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy 
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion 
of legitimate governmental interests.94 
In addition, to determine whether a “search” has occurred, 
the court must determine whether “the government violate[d] a 
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as rea-
sonable.”95 To determine whether a “seizure” has occurred, the 
court must determine whether, “in view of all of the circum-
stances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would 
have believed that he was not free to leave.”96 To determine 
whether a police officer had a “reasonable suspicion” sufficient 
to justify a Terry stop, the court must determine whether the 
officer had a “reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety.”97 
And so on. None of these determinations can sensibly be made 
without an ability to empathize with, and understand the 
thought processes of both, the police officer and the accused. To 
take just one example, it is impossible to determine whether a 
passenger should have felt entitled to refuse to cooperate with 
police officers who entered the bus on which he was riding, sta-
tioned officers on each end of the bus, and then walked down 
the aisle searching passengers and luggage,98 without attempt-
ing to put oneself into the shoes of the passenger. 
Indeed, in the just-decided case of J.D.B. v. North Caroli-
na,99 the need for empathy in Fourth Amendment decision 
making took center stage. After noting that a judge, in deter-
 
 93. See Wardlaw, supra note 3, at 1649 (noting protections under the 
Fourth Amendment would be altered without judicial empathy); Susan Bandes, 
Why is Empathy Controversial? Or Liberal?, BALKINIZATION (May 25, 2009, 9:48 
AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/05/why-is-empathy-controversial-or-liberal 
.html (“To resolve the Fourth Amendment issue, the Court must determine 
how intrusive the search was, how important the government interest was, 
and whether the government adopted a reasonable means of addressing its 
concern. To do that, it first has to understand what’s at stake for all the liti-
gants. That’s where empathy plays a role.”).  
 94. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 95. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). 
 96. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
 97. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 98. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 194 (2002).  
 99. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
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mining whether the defendant was in custody for purposes of 
Miranda v. Arizona,100 must consider whether a reasonable 
person in the suspect’s shoes would have felt free to leave,101 
the Court held that the judge must take the suspect’s age into 
account in making that determination.102 In his dissent, Justice 
Samuel A. Alito acknowledged that the Court’s holding requires 
judges to “attempt to put themselves in the shoes of the aver-
age 16-year-old, or 15-year-old, or 13-year-old, as the case may 
be.”103 He lamented the difficulty of “a 60-year-old judge at-
tempting to make a custody determination through the eyes of 
a hypothetical, average 15-year-old. Forty-five years of personal 
experience and societal change separate this judge from the 
days when he or she was 15 years old. And this judge may or 
may not have been an average 15-year-old.”104 
The Fourth Amendment is surely the most obvious exam-
ple of the need for this type of judicial empathy, but there is in 
fact nothing unique about the Fourth Amendment in this re-
gard. As Chemerinsky reminds us, “Reasonableness issues 
arise in countless areas of constitutional law.”105  
Consider the law of abortion rights. Under Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, regulations of pre-viability abortions may 
not impose an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to choose an 
abortion.106 “Casey, in short, struck a balance. The balance was 
central to its holding.”107 A judge cannot strike that balance in 
any given abortion case without empathizing with the woman, 
trying to understand, from her perspective, the extent to which 
the regulation burdens her right to choose. A judge must “as-
sess the effects of waiting periods, counseling mandates, and 
laws regulating the practice of abortion providers from a con-
textualized, fact-sensitive perspective that incorporates the real 
life circumstances of the girls and women actually impacted by 
these laws.”108 The judge must empathize with the woman’s 
hopes, concerns, and fears. Thus, for instance, the Court in Ca-
sey itself struck down a spousal-notification requirement after 
 
 100. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 101. See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402.  
 102. See id. at 2406. 
 103. Id. at 2416 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 1070. 
 106. 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). 
 107. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007). 
 108. Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond, 15 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L., 469, 488 (2009). 
 1970 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1944 
 
finding that many women “fear devastating forms of psycholog-
ical abuse from their husbands, including verbal harassment, 
threats of future violence, the destruction of possessions, physi-
cal confinement to the home, the withdrawal of financial sup-
port, or the disclosure of the abortion to family and friends.”109 
“We must not,” concluded the Court, “blind ourselves to the fact 
that the significant number of women who fear for their safety 
and the safety of their children are likely to be deterred from 
procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had 
outlawed abortion in all cases.”110 
These sorts of “[b]alancing tests pervade constitutional 
law,”111 from the Dormant Commerce Clause test that a non-
discriminatory state regulation “will be upheld unless the bur-
den imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation 
to the putative local benefits,”112 to the executive privilege 
mandate for judges to “weigh the importance of the general 
privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in 
performance of the President’s responsibilities against the in-
roads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal 
justice.”113 Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment 
claims turn on a balancing of the severity of the offense with 
the severity of the sentence to determine whether the sentence 
imposed on the offender is disproportionate to the harm inflict-
ed on society114—an inquiry that generally necessitates em-
 
 109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 893. 
 110. Id. at 894. 
 111. Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 55, 81 (2006); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional 
Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 943–45 (1987) (arguing that 
“balancing” as a “form of constitutional reasoning” has “become widespread, if 
not dominant, over the last four decades” and that “balancing has transformed 
constitutional adjudication and constitutional law”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard 
Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONN. L. REV. 961, 
963 (1998) (noting that “constitutional law today is dominated by the phenom-
enon of ‘balancing’”); Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism: A Structural 
Approach, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1161, 1179 (1998) (noting the “innumerable 
‘balancing’ tests [used] throughout constitutional law”). In the Supreme 
Court’s own words, “[t]he fact is that, regardless of the terminology used, the 
precise content of most of the Constitution’s civil-liberties guarantees rests 
upon an assessment of what accommodation between governmental need and 
individual freedom is reasonable.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643–
44 (1987). 
 112. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 113. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711–12 (1974). 
 114. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286–90 (1983) (holding that a crimi-
nal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which a defendant is  
convicted). 
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pathic understanding of the burden imposed on the offender,115 
and sometimes of the harm imposed upon the victim as well.116 
First Amendment freedom of expressive association claims re-
quire the Court to “balance the strength of the associational in-
terest in resisting governmental interference with the state’s 
justification for the interference,” which among other factors, 
“require[s] an assessment of . . . the strength of the association-
al interests asserted and their importance to the plaintiff.”117 
The 
question of whether speech of a government employee is constitution-
ally protected expression necessarily entails striking a balance be-
tween the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employ-
er, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees.118 
Government restrictions on speech in a limited public fo-
rum must be “reasonable,”119 as must government actions that 
interfere with the obligation of contracts.120 Public school offi-
cials can restrict student expression if “their actions are rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,”121 and 
time, place, and manner and other content-neutral restrictions 
on speech are unconstitutional if they “unreasonably limit al-
ternative avenues of communication.”122 Sixth Amendment in-
 
 115. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (“We can 
now give graphic description of Weems’s sentence . . . . No circumstance of 
degradation is omitted. It may be that even the cruelty of pain is not omitted. 
He must bear a chain night and day. He is condemned to painful as well as 
hard labor.”). 
 116. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 814–15 (1991) (allowing 
the jury to consider, in a case in which defendant killed a mother and her 
daughter, testimony from the victim’s mother regarding the words of the vic-
tim’s three-year-old son who survived the attack: “‘He cries for his mom. He 
doesn’t seem to understand why she doesn’t come home. And he cries for his 
sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during the week and asks me, 
Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I’m worried 
about my Lacie.’”). 
 117. Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 
502 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 118. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 119. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (ex-
plaining that government entities have a limited ability to regulate private 
speech in public forums). 
 120. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934) 
(explaining that legislative action which affects contracts must address a legit-
imate end, and the action must be “reasonable and appropriate to that end”). 
 121. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 122. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). 
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effectiveness of counsel cases turn on whether “counsel’s repre-
sentation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”123 
Prisoner suits challenging the deprivation of the rights turn on 
whether the prison regulation is reasonable in light of “legiti-
mate penological interests.”124 The Due Process Clause necessi-
tates “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstanc-
es, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”125 
Multifactor tests like the International Shoe126 test for personal 
jurisdiction require a judge to ascertain and balance, among 
other factors, “the burden on the defendant” and “the interstate 
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolu-
tion of controversies.”127 The notorious balancing test for proce-
dural due process claims turns on “the extent to which [the re-
cipient of government benefits] may be condemned to suffer 
grievous loss, and depends upon whether the recipient’s inter-
est in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest 
in summary adjudication,”128 a determination that of course ne-
cessitates an empathic understanding of the grievousness of 
the beneficiary’s suffering.  
Beyond these and other explicit balancing tests, most of 
constitutional doctrine turns on the application of the various 
levels of scrutiny,129 which are themselves in many respects 
“just a tool for arranging the weights in constitutional balanc-
ing.”130 The use of that tool often requires empathy, at both the 
ends and the means steps of the process.  
Evaluation of whether the State’s interest is “compelling” 
or “important” within the meaning of strict or intermediate 
scrutiny often necessitates judicial appreciation of the feelings 
of others. For instance, the Supreme Court has found that di-
versity in higher education is a compelling state interest in 
 
 123. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 124. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). 
 125. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
 126. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 127. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
 128. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 129. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 542 (3d ed. 2006) (“The levels of scrutiny are . . . extremely im-
portant in almost all areas involving individual rights and equal protection.”). 
 130. Chemerinsky, supra note 17, at 1071; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 
111, at 946 (noting that the inquiry into a “compelling” or “important” state 
interest involves balancing); Bhagwat, supra note 111, at 963–65 (explaining 
how the tiers of scrutiny, in practice, lead courts to engage in balancing). 
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part because obtaining a “critical mass” of minority students 
ensures that “underrepresented minority students do not feel 
isolated or like spokespersons for their race.”131  
Likewise, evaluation of whether the law is “narrowly tai-
lored” or “substantially related” to the State’s interest often re-
quires an empathic understanding of the cost that the regula-
tion imposes on individuals. Thus, for instance, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s conclusion that school districts must pur-
sue their compelling interests in avoiding racial isolation and 
achieving classroom diversity in a way that does not make 
school assignments turn on crude racial labels, because “[t]o be 
forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is incon-
sistent with the dignity of individuals in our society.”132  
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education133 was explicitly grounded in empathy for black chil-
dren.134 Only by putting themselves in the shoes of the chil-
dren, and understanding segregation from the emotional per-
spective of the children, could the Justices conclude that to 
“separate [black children] from others of similar age and quali-
fications solely because of their race generates a feeling of infe-
riority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”135 
Even when it purports to be applying only rational basis 
review, the Court at times engages in empathy to determine 
whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate govern-
ment interest. Usually, that empathy is with the legislators or 
government officials who cannot realistically be expected al-
ways to draw perfect lines in the course of doling out govern-
mental benefits or burdens.136 Sometimes, the empathy is with 
 
 131. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318–19 (2003). 
 132. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 133. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 134. See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1574, 1593–1609 (1987) (discussing Brown v. Board of Education and empa-
thetic understanding). 
 135. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 136. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1993) 
(“These restraints on judicial review have added force where the legislature 
must necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing. Defining the class of 
persons subject to a regulatory requirement—much like classifying govern-
mental beneficiaries—inevitably requires that some persons who have an al-
most equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different sides of 
the line, and the fact [that] the line might have been drawn differently at some 
points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial, considera-
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those who are harmed by the law. Thus, in Lawrence v. Texas, 
the Court found “no legitimate state interest which can justi-
fy . . . [the State’s] intrusion into the personal and private life of 
the individual” to the extent of denying gays and lesbians the 
right to sexual intimacy.137 Such a denial strips gays and lesbi-
ans of “their dignity as free persons”138 and “demean[s] their 
existence.”139 To reach that conclusion, the Court empathized 
with gays and lesbians enough to understand their sexual en-
counters from their emotional perspective, rather than the Jus-
tices’ own.140 “When sexuality finds overt expression in inti-
mate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one 
element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty 
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the 
right to make this choice.”141 
Of course, some realms of constitutional doctrine are domi-
nated by doctrinal tests other than the tiers of scrutiny, but 
those tests also frequently call for judicial empathy.142 Among 
 
tion. . . . Congress had to draw the line somewhere . . . .” (internal citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted)); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 
483, 489 (1955) (“Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and 
proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or 
the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the 
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may 
select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 137. 539 U.S. 558, at 578 (2003). 
 138. Id. at 567. 
 139. Id. at 578. 
 140. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Texas and the 
Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1031 (2005) (ar-
guing that earlier Court rulings on gay issues indicated that the Justices 
found gay sex to be “disgusting”). 
 141. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 142. For instance, the shocks-the-conscience test that governs substantive 
due process violations by executive officials requires judges to understand the 
official’s perspective on the events in question. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 855 (1998) (“While prudence would have repressed the 
reaction, the officer’s instinct was to do his job as a law enforcement officer, 
not to induce Willard’s lawlessness, or to terrorize, cause harm, or kill. Pru-
dence, that is, was subject to countervailing enforcement considerations, and 
while Smith exaggerated their demands, there is no reason to believe that 
they were tainted by an improper or malicious motive on his part.”). A judge 
must also place herself in the shoes of another in order to determine “whether 
particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the 
First Amendment into play,” which in turn depends on “whether [a]n intent to 
convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was 
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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the numerous Establishment Clause doctrines, for example, are 
the coercion and endorsement tests. The coercion test provides 
that “government may not coerce anyone to support or partici-
pate in religion or its exercise.”143 To determine whether the 
government has done so, a judge must seek to empathize with 
those who claim to feel coercive pressure. Thus, for instance, 
the Supreme Court has held that allowing clergy members to 
offer official prayers as part of a public school graduation cere-
mony violates the Establishment Clause because it “places pub-
lic pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to 
stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during 
the invocation and benediction. This pressure, though subtle 
and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”144 “[F]or 
the dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable percep-
tion that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner 
her conscience will not allow, the injury is . . . real.”145 The 
Court reached this conclusion after consciously attempting to 
empathize with the affected students, concluding that 
“[r]esearch in psychology supports the common assumption 
that adolescents are often susceptible to pressure from their 
peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in 
matters of social convention.”146 
The endorsement test asks “whether an objective observer, 
acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementa-
tion of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of” 
religion.147 This too requires a judge to place herself in another 
person’s (albeit, a hypothetical reasonable person’s) shoes to try 
to understand how that person is impacted by the government’s 
action. Only through empathy can the judge determine whether 
the government’s action impermissibly “sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community, and an accompanying message to adher-
ents that they are insiders, favored members of the political 
community.”148  
On top of all of this, psychologists understand empathy as 
an essential tool in predicting the behavior of others; to accu-
 
 143. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
 144. Id. at 593. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  
 148. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
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rately determine how other people are likely to act in particular 
circumstances, one has to first be able to determine how they 
would feel in those circumstances.149 A great deal of constitu-
tional doctrine requires judges to do just that. Free speech law, 
for example, contains numerous tests that require judges to 
predict how listeners will respond to speech. Under the Bran-
denburg v. Ohio incitement test, a judge may allow the State to 
punish “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation” only 
“where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion.”150 To apply that test, the judge must put herself into the 
shoes of the listeners to evaluate the likelihood that those par-
ticular persons would be incited to commit harm upon hearing 
those words spoken by that speaker in that manner at that 
place and time. Similarly, to apply the Chaplinsky v. N.H. 
fighting words test, the judge must understand the perspective 
of the listener to determine whether, in the particular circum-
stances of the case, the speech was “likely to provoke the aver-
age person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the 
peace.”151 
2. Beyond Constitutional Law 
The need to empathize in order to properly apply the law 
goes well beyond constitutional law. To begin with, common 
law decision making is now almost universally understood to be 
a form of lawmaking on the part of judges,152 and most observ-
ers would recognize that there is at least some aspect of conse-
quentialism embedded in the process of common law judging. 
That is to say, at least some of the time, a common law judge 
will formulate rules and decide cases based on her sense of 
what will, on balance, be best for the parties and for society.153 
 
 149. See, e.g., D’Arms, supra note 53, at 1487; Miller, supra note 53, at 
1010; Vignemont & Singer, supra note 53, at 439 (discussing the “epistemolog-
ical role” of empathy—its ability to provide information by helping us to pre-
dict the behavior of others). 
 150. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 151. 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).  
 152. See Schauer, supra note 17, at 885–88; Scalia, supra note 16, at 1176–
77.  
 153. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 18, at 94 (“There are some rules of pri-
vate law which have been shaped in their creation by public policy, and this, 
not merely silently or in conjunction with other forces, but avowedly, and al-
most, if not quite, exclusively.”); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 132 
(1961) (noting that common law judging is sometimes an indeterminate enter-
prise that necessitates “striking a balance, in the light of circumstances, be-
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A judge who lacks a taste or talent for empathy will not per-
form that aspect of her job particularly well. To determine 
which rule will be best for society, one needs to understand how 
the various members of society will be impacted by, and will re-
spond to, the possible rules.154 
On top of that, legal doctrine outside of the constitutional 
law arena, every bit as much as constitutional law doctrine, ne-
cessitates predicting the behavior of others,155 balancing indi-
vidual interests,156 and understanding the perspectives of oth-
ers. Across the entire doctrinal spectrum, public and private, 
 
tween competing interests”); Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Back-
ground of Nineteenth-Century Tort Law, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1127, 1128 (1990) 
(arguing that “judicial instrumentalism, understood as judges formulating, 
modifying, and changing legal rules to achieve public policy goals, was charac-
teristic of the common law for centuries”); Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social 
Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1943) (“The body of the common law is made 
up of adjustments or compromises of conflicting individual interests in which 
we turn to some social interest, frequently under the name of public policy, to 
determine the limits of a reasonable adjustment.”); David A. Strauss, Common 
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 900 (1996) (“Moral 
judgments—judgments about fairness, good policy, or social utility—have al-
ways played a role in the common law, and have generally been recognized as 
a legitimate part of common law judging.”).  
 154. Thus, Judge Posner, who elevates consequentialism to the center 
stage of judging, should be a champion of empathic judges. See generally Rich-
ard A. Posner, Legal Pragmatism Defended, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 683 (2004) (ad-
vocating legal pragmatism in judicial decision making); Richard A. Posner, 
What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1670 (1990) 
(“All that a pragmatic jurisprudence really connotes . . . is a rejection of a con-
cept of law as grounded in permanent principles and realized in logical ma-
nipulations of those principles, and a determination to use law as an instru-
ment for social ends.”). But see supra note 63 and accompanying text.  
 155. See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Deci-
sion Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1499, 1499–1500 (1998) (“Nearly all interesting legal issues require accurate 
predictions about human behavior to be resolved satisfactorily. Judg-
es . . . invoke mental models of individual and social behavior whenever they 
estimate the desirability of alternative rules, policies, or procedures.”). Con-
sider, as just one example, the law of pretrial detention, which requires a 
judge to “determine . . . whether the defendant is likely to flee the jurisdiction 
if released,” United States v. Vasconcellos, 519 F. Supp. 2d 311, 317 (N.D.N.Y. 
2007), and to predict the future dangerousness of the defendant, see United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).  
 156. See Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Bal-
ance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 3 & n.14 (1987) 
(noting that “balancing has emerged as the jurisprudential model at the center 
of the modern Court’s work,” so much so that “the word ‘balance’ or ‘balanc-
ing’ . . . appear[s] in 214 of the 473 cases decided in the last three years [pre-
ceding 1987]”); R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1381, 1399 n.104 (2006) (noting that “explic-
it balancing tests pervade civil and criminal law, constitutional and otherwise”). 
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civil and criminal, statutory and common law, our law is lit-
tered with “reasonableness” tests in general,157 and “reasonable 
person” tests in particular—tests that require judges to assume 
the perspective of various actors to determine whether their 
behavior was objectively reasonable.158  
In addition, mens rea and scienter doctrines routinely re-
quire judges to view and seek to understand events from the 
perspective of particular individuals.159 This inquiry is some-
 
 157. See George Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
949, 949 (1985) (“We lawyers should listen to the way we talk. If we paused to 
listen to our pattern of speech, we would be surprised by some of its distin-
guishing features. One of the most striking particularities of our discourse is 
its pervasive reliance on the term ‘reasonable.’ We routinely refer to reasona-
ble time, reasonable delay, reasonable reliance, and reasonable care. In crimi-
nal law, we talk incessantly of reasonable provocation, reasonable mistake, 
reasonable force, and reasonable risk.”); id. at 949 n.1 (“The Uniform Commer-
cial Code, the Model Penal Code, and the various restatements couple the ad-
jective ‘reasonable’ and the adverb ‘reasonably’ with over 100 different 
words.”); Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
21, 47 (1986) (“Anglo-American law is pervaded by standards that require sim-
ilar judgments of degree and reasonableness.”). Reasonableness tests infiltrate 
all areas of our law, from employment law, to tax law, and everything in be-
tween. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2009) (requiring employers to 
make a “reasonable accommodation” for employee disabilities); Randall S. 
Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 846, 856 (2011) (“Courts, for instance, have applied a reasonableness test 
to determine for tax purposes whether executive pay is in part a disguised div-
idend to officers/shareholders.”).  
 158. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (explaining 
that for qualified immunity purposes, a right is “clearly established” if “[t]he 
contours of the right . . . [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right”); Smith v. AmSouth 
Bank, Inc., 892 So.2d 905, 910 (Ala. 2004) (“[T]he question of foreseeability is 
answered by viewing events from the perspective of the defendant charged 
with negligence . . . .”); Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 207 P.3d 506, 513 (Cal. 
2009) (noting that negligence law requires “the trial court . . . [to] specifically 
conclude[ ] from the perspective of a reasonable [person] on the scene, taking 
into account the facts and circumstances confronting them, the [person’s] con-
duct was objectively reasonable”); Schafer v. State, Dep’t of Insts., 592 P.2d 
493, 495 (Mont. 1979) (“Foreseeability is measured on a scale of reasonable-
ness; it is not measured abstractly. . . . [T]he law judges the actor’s conduct in 
the light of the situation as it would have appeared to the reasonable man in 
his shoes at the time of the act or omission complained of. Not what actually 
happened, but what the reasonably prudent person would then have foreseen 
as likely to happen, is the key to the question of reasonableness.” (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted)), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Estate of Striver v. Cline, 924 P.2d 666 (Mont. 1996). 
 159. See, e.g., State v. Torres, 495 N.W.2d 678, 682 (Iowa 1993) (“In judging 
whether this act—sweeping the lamp off the table—was reckless, the district 
court could not use hindsight. The court had to put itself in Jimmy’s shoes at 
the moment of the act and then determine whether the act was reckless.”); 
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times objective—asking the judge to determine what a reason-
able person would have done—but even so, it still requires the 
judge to place the reasonable person in the shoes of the actor.160 
Other times, the inquiry is a subjective one—requiring the 
judge to assume the mindset of the actual actor himself.161 And 
sometimes, the judge is expected to do both. Consider the doc-
trine of self-defense. Some jurisdictions hold that, “[i]n deter-
mining whether a defendant has produced sufficient evidence 
to show reasonable apprehension of harm, the trial court must 
apply a mixed subjective and objective analysis.”162 The subjec-
tive component “requires the trial court to place itself in the de-
fendant’s shoes and view the defendant’s acts in light of all the 
facts and circumstances known to the defendant.”163 The objec-
tive component “requires the court to determine what a reason-
able person in the defendant’s situation would have done. The 
imminent threat of great bodily harm does not actually have to 
be present, so long as a reasonable person in the defendant’s 
situation could have believed that such threat was present.”164 
Many jurisdictions focus on the subjective inquiry, agreeing 
with Holmes that  
[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplift-
ed knife. Therefore . . . it is not a condition of immunity that one in 
that situation should pause to consider whether a reasonable man 
might not think it possible to fly with safety or to disable his assailant 
rather than to kill him.165  
 
Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 23 (Tex. 1994) (“Determining 
whether an act or omission involves extreme risk or peril requires an exami-
nation of the events and circumstances from the viewpoint of the defendant at 
the time the events occurred, without viewing the matter in hindsight.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Thornton v. State, 919 A.2d 678, 683 (Md. 2007) (“The requi-
site mens rea is measured by an objective standard, i.e., could or should a rea-
sonable person, under the circumstances, have foreseen that death would like-
ly ensue as a result of his or her conduct.”). 
 161. See, e.g., United States v. Buonocore, 416 F.3d 1124, 1133 (10th Cir. 
2005) (“[T]his inquiry is entirely subjective, the inquiry is not to be viewed 
from the perspective of a hypothetical reasonable person, and the mens rea el-
ement is not satisfied if Defendant acted through mistake, negligence, care-
lessness, or belief in an inaccurate proposition.”). 
 162. State v. Walker, 966 P.2d 883, 885 (Wash. 1998) (en banc). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921); see also, e.g., People 
v. Desmond, 93 A.D.2d 822, 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). 
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This inquiry necessitates empathy—a judicial ability to inter-
nalize the sense of panic that can overcome a person whose life 
may be in danger.166  
The defense based on battered women syndrome is a par-
ticularly clear example of the need for judicial empathy. To find 
(or allow a jury finding) that a woman’s fear of unavoidable 
harm was reasonable notwithstanding the fact that her hus-
band was asleep at the time that she killed him, a judge must 
understand the fragile emotional state of women who are vic-
tims of domestic violence.167 The judge must comprehend the 
“psychological reality for battered women,” which appears alien 
and counterintuitive to most people.168 Courts have appreciated 
that some “women . . . become so demoralized and degrad-
ed . . . that they sink into a state of psychological paralysis,” 
feel “low self-esteem” and “tremendous feelings of guilt,” and 
“literally become trapped by their own fear.”169 “Only by under-
standing these unique pressures that force battered women to 
remain with their mates, despite their long-standing and rea-
sonable fear of severe bodily harm and the isolation that being 
a battered woman creates, can a battered woman’s state of 
mind be accurately and fairly understood.”170 
Empathy pervades countless other inquiries that judges 
are required to perform. Child custody cases turn in part on the 
judge’s evaluation of the best interests of the child, and “there 
is no way to consider the best interests of the child without a 
consideration of the child’s feelings.”171 Awarding, or evaluating 
 
 166. Similarly, the provocation defense typically allows mitigation of mur-
der charges “if the defendant . . . was actually provoked into a heat of passion 
and a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would also have been pro-
voked.” CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 7 (2003). The Mod-
el Penal Code replaces this test with one that “permits mitigation if the de-
fendant was suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance for 
which a reasonable explanation or excuse exists.” Id. at 8. “The MPC explicitly 
states that the reasonableness of the defendant’s explanation or excuse must 
be determined from the defendant’s perspective.” Id. These inquiries too re-
quire empathy. See id. at 248–49. 
 167. See, e.g., State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 1989) (recog-
nizing the value of battered women syndrome evidence to dispel common mis-
conceptions, bolster the woman’s credibility, and establish the reasonableness 
of her fear of bodily harm). 
 168. State v. Daws, 662 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
 169. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psy-
chological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following 
Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305, 307 (1996); see, e.g., In re Leo M., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
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a jury award of, pain and suffering, mental anguish, or other 
forms of intangible damages requires a judge to empathize with 
the emotional pain of others.172 The test for whether to grant 
temporary or permanent injunctive relief requires the judge to 
evaluate the “balance of equities” between the parties,173 which 
means that the “court must balance the competing claims of in-
jury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting 
or withholding of the requested relief.”174 Numerous areas of 
our law employ “undue hardship” tests that require a judge to 
ascertain the burden on a party from that party’s perspective,175 
and often necessitate an appreciation of the emotional toll im-
posed by the conduct at issue.176 The Freedom of Information Act 
requires judges to evaluate personal privacy interests and bal-
ance them against the public interest in transparency.177  
Sexual harassment law requires a determination of wheth-
er the plaintiff was humiliated by the defendant’s conduct,178 
and whether the employer created an environment that was 
“both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasona-
ble person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the vic-
tim in fact did perceive to be so.”179 The subjective inquiry obvi-
ously necessitates empathy—a journey into the “[p]laintiff ’s 
 
253, 259 (1993) (noting that the judge must “explore the minor’s feelings re-
garding his/her biological parents, foster parents, and prospective adoptive 
parents, if any, as well as his/her current living arrangements”).  
 172. See, e.g., Connell v. Steel Haulers, Inc., 455 F.2d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 
1972) (noting that calculating mental anguish damages requires empathy). 
 173. Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 
 174. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987). 
 175. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006) (imposing an undue hardship 
test for the discharge of educational loans in bankruptcy); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000(e)( j) (employing an undue hardship test in religious accommodation); 
id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (imposing undue hardship test in disability accommoda-
tion); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii) (imposing an undue hardship test in civil 
discovery). 
 176. See, e.g., In re Fahrer, 308 B.R. 27, 36 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004) (“An-
other factor which this Court may take into consideration in determining 
whether repayment would constitute an undue hardship is the psychological 
and emotional impact of the Debtor’s continuing liability for the repayment of 
such a large sum of money over such an extended period of time.”). 
 177. See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 
(2004) (declaring that courts must “balance the family’s privacy interest 
against the public interest in disclosure” when applying the FOIA provision 
that bans disclosure of law enforcement records when disclosure would 
amount to “an unwarranted invasion . . . of personal privacy”). 
 178. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116 (2002) 
(identifying humiliating nature of discriminatory conduct as a relevant factor). 
 179. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998). 
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mind” to understand if she “felt humiliated and upset” and ex-
perienced “a loss of self-respect.”180 Similarly, “the objective se-
verity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a 
reasonable person in the plaintiff ’s position, considering all the 
circumstances.”181 “[T]hat inquiry requires careful considera-
tion of [how the] behavior . . . is experienced by its target” and 
“an appropriate sensitivity to social context.”182 A judge must 
therefore assume the often very foreign perspective of someone 
in the shoes of the plaintiff.183  
This list could go on for pages. Such is the nature of our le-
gal system; it requires judicial empathy to apply legal doc-
trine.184 That is why the best lawyers write their legal briefs in 
a manner that seeks to draw empathy from the judge, using the 
fact section to tell a story that helps the judge to see the case 
from their client’s perspective.185 This is not to say that empa-
thy is essential in every single case. Surely, one could come up 
with a list of cases in which the nature of the doctrinal rules, 
the litigants, or the situation at hand renders empathy rela-
tively unimportant. But the fact remains that, across the entire 
 
 180. Smith v. Nw. Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1413 (10th Cir. 
1997). 
 181. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 Fed. App’x 585, 589 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (“The unwelcome ‘chest to breast’ hugs made Boswell feel embar-
rassed and humiliated, and the jury could conclude that a reasonable woman 
in Boswell’s position would have felt the same way.”); United States v. Dowd, 
417 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that many courts have held “that 
harassment should be analyzed from the perspective of the victim, taking into 
account the gender of the plaintiff alleging a hostile work environment”). 
 184. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 326 (1993) (arguing 
that adjudicative decision making requires “the capacity to entertain a point of 
view defined by interests, attitudes, and values different from one’s own with-
out actually endorsing it”); Benjamin Zipursky, Note, DeShaney and the Ju-
risprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1103, 1135–37 (1990) (ar-
guing that “certain concepts can only be fully understood from a perspective 
that includes empathy and compassion” and “[b]ecause some of those concepts 
are embedded in the law, interpretation of the law requires compassion”). 
 185. See Elyse Pepper, The Case for “Thinking like a Filmmaker”: Using 
Lars von Trier’s Dogville as a Model for Writing a Statement of Facts, 14 LE-
GAL WRITING 171, 171–73 (2008) (arguing that the best advocacy uses a movie-
like narrative); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon be-
tween Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2272 
(1989) (arguing that a good narrative creates a persuasive effect); cf. Hender-
son, supra note 134, at 1592 (noting that lawyers often frame a case with “em-
pathic narratives”). 
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spectrum of legal doctrine, empathy is very often essential to 
good judging.  
3. A Law of Rules? 
Of course, not everyone celebrates the current state of our 
legal doctrine. One imagines that, to someone like Justice An-
tonin Scalia, the preceding several pages of this Article would 
read like a horror novel: a grotesque parade of everything that 
is wrong with American legal doctrine; a hall of fame of subjec-
tive doctrinal mushiness that should be purged from the judi-
cial canon forthwith. Justice Scalia has long criticized our law 
for relying too much on open-ended balancing tests in lieu of 
straightforward, bright-line rules. The rule of law, Justice Scal-
ia insists, calls for a law of rules,186 and thus judges should 
make legal doctrines that establish general rules rather than 
flexible standards.187 Perhaps if they did so, there would be less 
of a need for empathy on the part of the judges who apply those 
doctrines.188 
Perhaps. But even Justice Scalia acknowledges that we do 
not currently live in such a world—to the contrary, “sticking 
close to [the] facts, not relying upon overarching generaliza-
tions, and thereby leaving considerable room for future judges 
is thought to be the genius of the common-law system” in which 
we now reside.189 And he further acknowledges that it would be 
impossible to purge open-ended standards from the law alto-
gether—“[w]e will have totality of the circumstances tests and 
balancing modes of analysis with us forever.”190 
 What is more, even if we were someday to make the 
massive transition to a world driven by rules rather than 
standards, judges would still have to make the rules.191 And 
that process too requires empathy—at least if it is going to be 
done well. That is to say, the shaping of the doctrine, not just 
 
 186. See Scalia, supra note 16, at 1175.  
 187. See id. at 1176–77. 
 188. Cf. Massaro, supra note 64, at 2110–20 (noting that many advocates of 
empathy in the law seek fewer rules and more open-ended standards to allow 
individual stories and emotions to dictate decisions).  
 189. Scalia, supra note 16. 
 190. Id. at 1187. 
 191. See id. at 1176 (“For I want to explore the dichotomy between general 
rules and personal discretion within the narrow context of law that is made by 
the courts.”).  
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its application, necessitates empathy.192 Suzanna Sherry ex-
plains that legal doctrines  
are built on foundational facts: potentially contested factual assump-
tions that are embedded in the doctrine itself and on which the doc-
trine is based.193 . . . Whether a particular defendant acted in a par-
ticular way out of a particular motive are decisional facts . . . . But the 
likelihood of actors in defendant’s position acting in a particular way 
or having a particular motive is a foundational fact, and doctrinal 
rules—including burdens of proof and standards of review—will be 
structured differently depending on whether judges assume a high or 
low likelihood.194 
These determinations about the likelihood of particular actors 
behaving in particular ways or having particular motives must 
be based on the judge’s ability to place herself in the shoes of 
those actors.195  
 In addition, the creation of doctrinal rules often involves 
“definitional balancing” (as distinct from the “ad hoc balancing” 
required by the application of those rules).196 In free speech 
 
 192. See Mary Becker, The Passions of Battered Women: Cognitive Links 
Between Passion, Empathy, and Power, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 2 
(2001) (“Empathy plays crucial roles in both shaping law and affecting out-
comes in litigation. . . . The ability or inability to empathize with someone is 
often the basis for either recognition or denial of a tort action to redress an in-
jury or of a defense in such an action. Similar points could be made about all 
areas of law and hold whether the law is made by judges or by legislators.”). 
 193. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 145, 146. “Foundational facts are the background facts that are 
not explicitly at issue in any particular case; they are the meta-facts on which 
the doctrine itself depends.” Id. at 150. 
 194. Id. at 146. 
 195. To take just one example, the Supreme Court has based its decisions 
to create, and then expand, the good faith exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment’s exclusionary rule on predictions about how police officers (and other 
actors in the criminal justice system) would likely behave. See Arizona v. Ev-
ans, 514 U.S. 1, 15 (1995) (“[T]here is no basis for believing that application of 
the exclusionary rule in these circumstances will have a significant effect on 
court employees responsible for informing the police that a warrant has been 
quashed. Because court clerks are not adjuncts to the law enforcement team 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, they have 
no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions. The threat of ex-
clusion of evidence could not be expected to deter such individuals from failing 
to inform police officials that a warrant had been quashed.”); United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984) (“If exclusion of evidence obtained pursuant to 
a subsequently invalidated warrant is to have any deterrent effect, therefore, 
it must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies 
of their departments.”).  
 196. See Aleinikoff, supra note 111, at 948 (arguing that definition balanc-
ing sets a “principle of general application”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: 
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 77–78 (1997) (discussing 
the role of balancing in “the process by which the Court crafts doctrine in the 
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law, for instance, the Supreme Court has established a rules-
based framework pursuant to which certain categories of 
speech are generally excluded from the scope of the First 
Amendment. The Court insists that “the right of free speech is 
not absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There 
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought 
to raise any Constitutional problem.”197 Which classes of speech 
are excluded? Those that “are no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”198 The 
categorical rules—that obscenity, fighting words, child pornog-
raphy, et cetera, are generally excluded from the scope of the 
First Amendment—are themselves the product of judicial bal-
ancing of individual and state interests.199 And empathy is, of 
course, needed to determine the weight of both the individual’s 
interest in speech200 and society’s interest in exclusion.201  
 
first instance”); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: 
First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 
CALIF. L. REV. 935, 942 (1968) (coining the term “definitional” balancing). 
 197. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 198. Id. at 572. 
 199. See Nimmer, supra note 196 (“[T]he Court employs balancing not for 
the purpose of determining which litigant deserves to prevail in the particular 
case, but only for the purpose of defining which forms of speech are to be re-
garded as ‘speech’ within the meaning of the first amendment.”). But see Unit-
ed States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585–86 (2010) (suggesting, implausibly, 
that the excluded categories are determined by history rather than balancing). 
 200. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) ( liberalizing the defi-
nition of obscenity in order to ensure that serious literary, artistic, political, 
and scientific speech is not censored); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26 
(1971) (declining to treat profanity as an excluded category because many 
speakers find lyrical beauty in words that others find offensive, and because 
often profanity is essential to fully convey one’s emotions). Empathy for speak-
ers is also evinced by the fact that much of the Court’s free speech jurispru-
dence—including, for instance, the overbreadth doctrine—has been based on 
the Court’s evaluation of whether potential speakers would be chilled from 
speaking out of fear of liability. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 
449, 497 n.5 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (“Our normal practice is to assess ex ante the risk that a standard will 
have an impermissible chilling effect on First Amendment protected speech.”). 
This inquiry involves placing oneself in the shoes of the speaker and predict-
ing how he would likely behave. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 
(2003) (“We have provided this expansive remedy out of concern that the 
threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or ‘chill’ constitutionally 
protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal 
sanctions. Many persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and 
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Even when they are not based on definitional balancing, 
good judge-made doctrines are of necessity the product of em-
pathy—either in the sense of understanding the emotional per-
spective of others, or in the sense of predicting the behavior of 
others (which itself is dependent on an ability to understand 
the emotional perspective of others).202 Two examples from the 
constitutional law arena should suffice to illustrate the point. 
First, the Supreme Court based its decision that police officers 
are generally not liable to bystanders who were injured during 
a high-speed police chase on its ability to empathize with offic-
ers who “have obligations that tend to tug against each oth-
er. . . . They are supposed to act decisively and to show re-
straint at the same moment, and their decisions have to be 
made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the lux-
ury of a second chance.”203 Second, the Court based its decision 
that the executive privilege must generally yield to a criminal 
subpoena on the ground that it “cannot conclude that advisers 
will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the in-
frequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that 
such conversations will be called for in the context of a criminal 
prosecution.”204  
In sum, even a law of rules requires judges to make the 
rules, and judges cannot make rules competently without em-
pathizing broadly with the potentially affected parties. Moreo-
ver, this fundamental reality of judicial lawmaking cannot be 
avoided by taking refuge in an allegedly objective judicial phi-
 
sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation, will 
choose simply to abstain from protected speech . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 201. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758–59 & n.10 (1982) 
(adding child pornography to the list of excluded categories because “the use of 
children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, 
emotional, and mental health of the child,” in that a “child who has posed for a 
camera must go through life knowing that the recording is circulating within 
the mass distribution system for child pornography” and “the fear of exposure 
and the tension of keeping the act secret . . . have . . . profound emotional re-
percussions” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) ( limiting First Amendment protection for 
defamation of private figures because of the state interest in “the compensa-
tion of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood,” an 
interest that “reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity 
and worth of every human being” (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 202. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 203. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853 (1998) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 204. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 (1974). 
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losophy. There are those who believe that employing an 
originalist interpretive methodology would allow judges to as-
certain historically determined constitutional rules without 
having to resort to empathy, or any other subjective method of 
rulemaking.205 Not so. This issue goes well beyond the scope of 
this Article,206 but the bottom line is that originalism does not, 
in fact, purge subjectivity from judging. As many originalists 
have themselves come to recognize, the constitutional provi-
sions that generate the most litigation are written in such 
broad, open-ended terms that their original public meaning is 
too general to establish concrete rules of decision.207 Randy 
Barnett explains that, “[d]ue to either ambiguity or generality, 
the original meaning of the [constitutional] text may not always 
determine a unique rule of law to be applied to a particular 
case or controversy.”208 Thus, “there is often a gap between ab-
stract or general principles of the kind found in the Constitu-
tion and the rules of law that are needed to put these principles 
into action;”209 a commitment to original meaning will not dic-
tate particular doctrinal rules. Most constitutional doctrines 
supported by originalist judges are therefore “not precisely 
mandated by the original meaning of the constitutional text, 
but rather, have been invented by judges in an effort to put the 
Constitution’s open-ended textual meaning into effect.”210 Even 
originalist judges cannot avoid the need to invent legal rules.211 
No judge can avoid the need to empathize.  
 
 205. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 16, at 1183–84. 
 206. For detailed exploration, see Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage 
Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529 
(2008), and Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. 
L.J. 713 (2011) [hereinafter New Originalism]. 
 207. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: 
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 8 (1999) (“Traditional tools 
of interpretive analysis can be exhausted without providing a constitutional 
meaning that is sufficiently clear to guide government action. The text may 
specify a principle that is itself identifiable but is nonetheless indeterminate 
in its application to a particular situation. . . . Alternatively, the principle es-
tablished by the text may be unclear . . . .”) (footnote omitted). 
 208. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 
611, 645 (1999). 
 209. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 109–10 (2001).  
 210. New Originalism, supra note 206, at 733.  
 211. See id. at 749–64 (detailing the profound extent to which the “New 
Originalism” fails to dictate rules of constitutional law). 
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C. THE THIRD CUT: DIFFERENCES IN THE CAPACITY TO 
EMPATHIZE 
As Adam Smith noted long ago, no one can empathize per-
fectly with another’s feelings.212 But scientists have confirmed 
that some people are able to come much closer to doing so than 
others.213 Simon Baron-Cohen, Professor of Developmental Psy-
chopathology at the University of Cambridge, has developed an 
empathy quotient—a means of measuring an individual’s ca-
pacity for empathy—and has determined that the population’s 
empathic skills can be plotted on a bell curve.214 There are ten 
major regions of the brain that are involved in empathy, and 
the differences in individuals’ empathic abilities can actually be 
documented in neural brain scans.215 
 
 212. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS ¶ I.i.4.7 (Ox-
ford Press 1976) (“Mankind, though naturally sympathetic, never conceive, for 
what has befallen another, that degree of passion which naturally animates 
the person principally concerned. . . . [T]he thought that they themselves are 
not really the sufferers, continually intrudes itself upon them; and though it 
does not hinder them from conceiving a passion somewhat analogous to what 
is felt by the sufferer, hinders them from conceiving any thing that approaches 
to the same degree of violence.”). 
 213. See MARK H. DAVIS, EMPATHY: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 
46–61 (1996) (arguing for individual psychological profiles concerning empa-
thy); KATZ, supra note 62, at 57 (arguing that empathetic power differs by in-
dividual); MORRELL, supra note 53, at 109–15 (noting that studies have found 
variation in the capacity to empathize with out-groups); TANIA SINGER & 
ERNST FEHR, THE NEUROECONOMICS OF MIND READING AND EMPATHY 9 
(2005) (recounting studies that suggest “that there are individual differences 
in empathic abilities”); Mark A. Barnett, Empathy and Related Responses in 
Children, in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT, supra note 53, at 146, 149 (dis-
cussing scientific “evidence that young children can differ markedly in their 
capacity or willingness to be sensitive and responsive to the feelings of oth-
ers”); Janet Strayer and Nancy Eisenberg, Empathy Viewed in Context, in EM-
PATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT, supra note 53, at 389, 396 (noting that the ca-
pacity for empathy may vary across individuals).  
 214. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 13 (illustrating a quantitative 
model of empathy across the population). Baron-Cohen has divided the con-
tinuum into seven degrees of empathy. See id. at 16–19. Other scientists have 
devised various other scales for measuring empathy. See Jolliffe & Farrington, 
supra note 58, at 590, 592 (discussing other scales and proposing and employ-
ing a new one). 
 215. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 19–28, 42–43, 54–57, 68–71 (not-
ing that functional magnetic resonance imaging has identified ten regions of 
the brain that are correlated with empathy; people with low empathic abilities 
show less neural activity in these areas); SINGER & FEHR, supra note 213, at 6 
(noting that studies have “confirmed that the ability to empathize is heteroge-
neous across individuals” and can be seen in neural scans); Tom F.D. Farrow, 
Neuroimaging of Empathy, in EMPATHY IN MENTAL ILLNESS 201, 201–17 (Tom 
F.D. Farrow & Peter W.R. Woodruff eds., 2007) (illustrating the neuro-
imaging of empathy). 
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These disparities appear to be partially determined by ge-
netics216 and other biological factors.217 They are also believed 
to stem in substantial part from environmental influences dur-
ing childhood, including family relationships and parenting 
styles, particularly in matters of discipline.218  
Studies suggest, however, that one’s empathic abilities are 
not completely predetermined by biology and early childhood.219 
It seems that those who are willing to work at it can get better 
at empathizing.220  
Since empathy is an essential tool for good judging, and 
since people naturally vary in their empathic abilities, it makes 
 
 216. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 86 (concluding “that environ-
mental factors interact with genes for empathy” and that “some genes are as-
sociated with your score on various measures of empathy”); id. at 94 (explain-
ing that studies have identified four genes associated with empathy); DAVIS, 
supra note 213, at 62–70; id. at 64 (summarizing studies showing that “genetic 
factors seem to make a substantial contribution to individual differences in 
affective empathy”).  
 217. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 93 (discussing studies that have 
found that testosterone shapes “empathy circuit[s]” in the brains of developing 
fetuses, and the more testosterone a fetus generates in the womb, the less em-
pathic the child will end up being); Strayer & Eisenberg, supra note 213. 
 218. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 47 (noting that “how your moth-
er (or father) treated you turns out to be very important . . . for the develop-
ment of healthy empathy”); id. at 57; DAVIS, supra note 213, at 70–81; MARTIN 
L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR CARING 
AND JUSTICE 282 (2000) (noting that empathy “can be destroyed by power-
assertive childrearing, diminished by cultural valuing of competition over 
helping others, and overwhelmed by egoistic motives within the individu-
al . . . .”); Barnett, supra note 213, at 149–57. See generally ARNOLD P. 
GOLDSTEIN & GERALD Y. MICHAELS, EMPATHY: DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING, AND 
CONSEQUENCES 12–61 (1985) (discussing the development of empathy). 
 219. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 120 (noting that “there is al-
ready evidence that components of empathy (such as emotion recognition) can 
be learned”); GOLDSTEIN & MICHAELS, supra note 218, at 50 (discussing a pro-
gram that appeared to improve empathic abilities in adolescents); HOFFMAN, 
supra note 218 (same); KATZ, supra note 62, at 59–61; Martin L. Hoffman, The 
Contribution of Empathy to Justice and Moral Judgment, in EMPATHY AND ITS 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 53, at 47, 69 (arguing that moral education can 
overcome empathic biases). This is an area in which more empirical studies 
are needed. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 101–02 (discussing thera-
pies, technologies, and even medical treatments that might be effective in in-
creasing empathy); id. at 120 (“These methods only scratch the surface in 
terms of what could be tried . . . . Counselling and other psychological thera-
pies such as role-playing techniques purport to be aiming to encourage empa-
thy, and it would be valuable to have systematic studies to show if these are 
working. . . . [ I ]t would not be surprising if someone who is slightly below av-
erage in their [empathy score] slightly boosted their empathy following  
intervention.”).  
 220. See Miller, supra note 53, at 1010.  
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sense that the President should look for judges who possess 
strong empathic skills. (Intelligence is also an essential skill for 
good judging, and we would hardly fault a President who ex-
plicitly seeks smart judges.) And since empathic abilities seem-
ingly can be honed and improved, it makes sense that the Pres-
ident would look for judges who have openly expressed an 
interest in empathy.  
D. THE FINAL CUT: EMPATHIC BLIND SPOTS 
Not only is there variance across the population in general 
empathic abilities, but there is also variance within each indi-
vidual’s ability to empathize, depending on the target of their 
empathy. That is to say, we all naturally empathize with some 
people more than others. More specifically, there is substantial 
“research evidence that observers are more empathic to [per-
sons] who are familiar and similar to themselves than to [per-
sons] who are different.”221  
Accordingly, in assigning weight to the interests of the var-
ious parties in the course of making or applying legal doctrine, 
judges are naturally inclined to empathize with—and thus 
place greater value upon—the feelings and interests of those 
whose circumstances and experiences most closely resemble 
their own. Thus, for instance, studies show that female judges 
do not tend to decide cases markedly differently than male 
judges, except in the area of sex discrimination.222 When it 
 
 221. Hoffman, supra note 219, at 67; see also HOFFMAN, supra note 218, at 
283 (“Empathic morality is also subject to biases that favor friends, relatives, 
and people similar to oneself.”); Barnett, supra note 213, at 154 (noting that 
“[c]hildren have been found to respond more empathically to those who are 
perceived as similar to the self than to those who are perceived as dissimilar”); 
Lisa M. Brown et al., Affective Reactions to Pictures of Ingroup and Outgroup 
Members, 71 BIOLOGICAL PSYCH. 303–311 (2006) (presenting results of study 
that found that people empathize more with members of their own ethnic 
group); Henderson, supra note 134, at 1581 n.35 (noting that children show 
more empathy for persons who are like themselves and for people in situations 
that they have experienced themselves); Tania Singer et al., Empathic Neural 
Responses are Modulated by the Perceived Fairness of Others, 439 NATURE 
466, 466 (2006) (noting that neural studies show that, sometimes, people em-
pathize more with persons whom they like than with persons whom they dis-
like); Vignemont & Singer, supra note 53, at 438 (noting that an important 
factor in determining whether a person can empathize with another is wheth-
er the would-be empathizer has had experiences similar to those of the other 
person); id. at 439 (noting that studies have found that ability to predict the 
actions of others through empathy “depends on the similarity between the em-
pathizer’s and the target’s experiential repertoires”). 
 222. See Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on 
Judging, 54 AM. JUR. POL. SCI. 389, 390 (2010). 
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comes to that area—and not others—male and female judges, 
whose backgrounds tend to be otherwise quite similar, have 
starkly different perspectives. Male judges are more naturally 
inclined to see the employer’s side, and they have trouble em-
pathizing with the woman’s perspective. Female judges are 
naturally more inclined to understand and value the woman’s 
perspective, as it more closely resembles their own. 
Similarly, and perhaps even more interestingly, prelimi-
nary results of a recent study of the voting patterns of federal 
appellate judges suggest that judges who have daughters are 
significantly more likely to vote in favor of women in cases in-
volving sex discrimination, pregnancy discrimination, and re-
productive rights than are judges who have sons.223 This effect 
persists after controlling for other potentially relevant charac-
teristics, including partisanship, and does not extend to other 
categories of cases.224 These results “suggest that the effect 
may be due in part to the empathy that parents feel toward 
their daughters . . . .”225 A judge with daughters finds it easier 
to empathize with the women in these cases; their experiences 
and perspectives are more familiar and comprehensible to him 
than they are to a judge who does not have daughters.  
Everyone, or almost everyone anyway, can empathize with 
familiar perspectives. A good judge has to be able to empathize 
with unfamiliar ones, too. Key to good judging is both a desire 
and an ability to overcome the natural inclination to empathize 
more with those whose experiences and circumstances resem-
ble one’s own. To succeed at their jobs, judges must also empa-
thize with those who are most different from and unfamiliar to 
them, and whose interests and perspectives they are likely to 
naturally undervalue.226 
 
 223. See Adam Glynn & Maya Sen, Like Daughter, Like Judge: How Having 
Daughters Affect Judges’ Voting on Women’s Issues 28 (Mar. 10, 2011) (working 
paper), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/msen/files/judicialdaughters.pdf. 
 224. Id. (manuscript at 1). 
 225. Id. (manuscript at 29); see also id. (suggesting that judicial decision 
making appears to be driven in part by “empathic connections”). 
 226. Although this Article does not focus on such a claim, it is worth noting 
that there appears to be a “general consensus among scholars in various fields 
who have studied emotion” that “reasoning has an emotive aspect.” Susan 
Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 361, 366 (1996); see also Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural 
Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 629, 645–48 (2011). “It is 
[therefore] incoherent to say that a judge should base an opinion on reason 
and not emotion because emotions are an inherent part of decision-making. 
Emotions are the process we use to assign value to different possibilities.” Da-
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V.  THE INADEQUACY OF THE NON-EMPATHIC,  
UMPIRE JUDGE   
A judge who believes in the popular portrait of judges as 
umpires, and who rejects as illegitimate calls for judicial empa-
thy, will “call ‘em like he sees ’em”—applying the law as he un-
derstands it to the facts as he perceives them. What he will fail 
to realize is that he is seeing the case from a particular per-
spective—his own—and is mistaking that perspective for an 
unbiased, neutral one. What he views as the disinterested, 
“correct” answer will in fact in many close cases just be the con-
tingent answer that he arrives at after unintentionally privileg-
ing his own perspective—subconsciously empathizing with 
those whose experiences he shares, whose perspective comes 
naturally to him, and whose plight strikes a chord with him. 
Without meaning to, he will give disproportionate weight to 
their interests in his legal calculus and undervalue the inter-
ests of those whose perspectives he does not fully appreciate. 
All the while, he will claim, and genuinely believe, that he is 
being completely neutral—an umpire, just calling balls and 
strikes. But in fact, he will tend disproportionately to decide 
cases in favor of the parties with whom he most naturally em-
pathizes—usually large corporations, the government, employ-
ers, and the like, given the background of most federal judges227 
(especially most conservative federal judges, who are the most 
likely to endorse umpiring over empathy). This distorts the law. 
It is bad judging under a false (and falsely superior) sense of 
neutrality and professional excellence.228  
 
vid Brooks, Op-Ed., The Empathy Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at A25. If 
this is true—that all reasoning, including legal reasoning, necessarily has an 
emotional component—then empathy is all the more important to good judg-
ing. If a judge cannot help but base her rulings at least in part on her emo-
tional view of the case, then it is essential that she comprehend and feel the 
emotional perspective of all of the parties, rather than just the ones with 
whom she feels a natural affinity. Cf. Bandes, supra, at 370 (noting that be-
cause emotions have a cognitive aspect and can change as we are exposed to 
new information and new experiences, if one is empathic, “it may be possible 
to mitigate the limitations of one’s own perspective” in forming an emotional 
reaction to a case).  
 227. See infra note 276 and accompanying text. 
 228. Cf. Bandes, supra note 53, at 139–42 (noting the danger of selective 
empathy that comes from mistaking one’s own perspective for a neutral and 
unbiased one); Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: 
Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 410 (1983) (“The real threat that a judge’s personal ide-
ologies may affect his decisions in an inappropriate case arises when the judge 
is not even consciously aware of the potential threat.”); McKee, supra note 12, 
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Chief Justice Roberts may believe that he “confront[s] eve-
ry case with an open mind . . . fully and fairly analyz[ing] the 
legal arguments . . . and decid[ing] every case . . . according to 
the rule of law . . . [and that he simply] call[s] balls and 
strikes . . . .”229 But, according to one observer, “[i]n every major 
case since he became the nation’s seventeenth Chief Justice, 
Roberts has sided with the prosecution over the defendant, the 
state over the condemned, the executive branch over the legis-
lative, and the corporate defendant over the individual plain-
tiff.”230 The Chief Justice thinks that he is umpiring in a neu-
tral fashion, but perhaps he is just subconsciously empathizing 
only with those whose experiences and perspectives most close-
ly resemble his own as a former corporate and executive-branch 
lawyer.231  
Similar concerns can be raised about Justice Scalia, at 
least some of the time. Justice Scalia is acutely aware of the 
danger “that the judges will mistake their own predilections for 
the law,” and he believes that “[a]voiding this error is the hard-
est part of being a conscientious judge.”232 Yet his jurispru-
dence evinces a tendency to empathize only with those like 
himself, which sometimes leads him to commit the very error 
that he takes pride in avoiding.  
Consider Lee v. Weisman, in which the Supreme Court 
held, over Justice Scalia’s dissent, that allowing clergy mem-
bers to offer official prayers as part of a public school gradua-
 
at 1712 (“The umpire metaphor obscures the reality of personal bias. Getting 
beyond that bias is extremely difficult even for the most introspective and sin-
cere judge.”); Cheryl L. Wade, When Judges Are Gatekeepers: Democracy, Mo-
rality, Statu, and Empathy in Duty Decisions (Help from Ordinary Citizens), 
80 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 49 (1996) (noting that, if judges fail to empathize with all 
parties, their decisions will tend to reflect the values of the segments of society 
from which they themselves have been drawn); Wardlaw, supra note 3, at 
1649 (“It is those judges who are unable to understand the views and problems 
of others—who are unable to assess problems from any vantage point other 
than their own—who may not be up to the task of administering justice equal-
ly and impartially.”). 
 229. Roberts Hearing, supra note 7, at 56. 
 230. Jeffrey Toobin, No More Mr. Nice Guy, NEW YORKER (May 25, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/25/090525fa_fact_toobin.  
 231. For a similar charge against Justice Alito, see Emily Bazelon, Myste-
rious Justice, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 2011, at MM13. Bazelon cites instances 
of Alito’s opinions evincing empathy for military families and white men, but 
argues that “Alito’s sense of empathy never seems to involve an act of imagi-
nation; it rarely extends to people who are not like him.” Id.  
 232. Scalia, supra note 32. 
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tion ceremony violates the Establishment Clause.233 The 
Court’s majority opinion was grounded in a conscious attempt 
to empathize with students who practice a minority religion (or 
no religion) and suffer emotional injury from the school’s con-
duct.234 In his dissent, Justice Scalia utterly failed to under-
stand or appreciate those interests, derisively labeling the inju-
ry as nothing more than “minimal inconvenience.”235 He was  
oblivious to the fact that, for a nonbeliever or a practitioner of a non-
Judeo-Christian religion, the harm of having either to participate in a 
prayer that runs counter to one’s core religious beliefs or to be stared 
at and ostracized for not doing so is a very serious one—especially to a 
teenager trying to fit in and find acceptance in a world in which she is 
already an outsider.236 
Justice Scalia cast his lot instead with the members of the ma-
jority who, like him, enjoy prayer, and who will now be pre-
cluded from hearing biblical prayer at future graduations: 
“[N]othing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster among 
religious believers of various faiths a toleration—no, an affec-
tion—for one another than voluntarily joining in prayer togeth-
er, to the God whom they all worship and seek.”237 Seeking to 
balance the interests of both sides, Justice Scalia found that 
the interests of those whose values and experiences matched 
his own—whose perspective he understood and shared—easily 
trumped the interests of those whose emotional struggles he 
made no effort to appreciate: 
The Baptist or Catholic who heard and joined in the simple and in-
spiring prayers . . . on this official and patriotic occasion was inocu-
lated from religious bigotry and prejudice in a manner that cannot be 
replicated. To deprive our society of that important unifying mecha-
nism, in order to spare the nonbeliever what seems to me the minimal 
inconvenience of standing or even sitting in respectful nonparticipa-
tion, is as senseless in policy as it is unsupported in law.238 
More than a decade later, Justice Scalia did it again, this 
time in the course of voting to uphold a Ten Commandments 
monument in a public courthouse. He correctly noted that, “in 
the context of public acknowledgments of God there are legiti-
 
 233. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 234. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text. 
 235. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 236. Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice 
Scalia, the Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 
100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1120 (2006). 
 237. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 645–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recounting “the 
personal interests on the other side”). 
 238. Id. at 646. 
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mate competing interests.”239 But he then went on to place van-
ishingly little value on the interests of those with whom he has 
no natural tendency to empathize (“[o]n the one hand, the in-
terest of that minority in not feeling ‘excluded’”) and to place 
great value on the interests of those whose plight he shared 
(“but on the other, the interest of the overwhelming majority of 
religious believers in being able to give God thanks and suppli-
cation as a people, and with respect to our national endeav-
ors.”)240 A Christian himself, he seemed “blind to the fact that 
nonmonotheists suffer serious alienation when their govern-
ment erects and endorses ‘as a people’ a religious monument 
that explicitly rejects and condemns nonmonotheists’ deeply 
held beliefs and practices.”241 
Another example of Justice Scalia’s empathic limits is his 
declaration in California v. Hodari D. that it “contradicts pro-
verbial common sense” to suggest that, as a matter of Fourth 
Amendment law, “it would be unreasonable to stop, for brief 
inquiry, young men who scatter in panic upon the mere sight-
ing of the police.”242 As Tracey Maclin has noted, “From a police 
perspective, Justice Scalia’s remarks may make sense.”243 A po-
lice officer might be inclined to believe that someone who runs 
away at his approach must be hiding something. But “this 
viewpoint never considers that Hodari, a black youth, may have 
had alternative reasons for wanting to avoid the police.”244 In 
light of numerous reports of police officers harassing, harming, 
or humiliating black youths in random stops, from the perspec-
tive of the youth, it might have made perfect sense to run away 
even if he had nothing to hide. 
Justice Scalia may think that an approaching officer only wants to 
ask “What’s going on here?” A black youth, however, may have had a 
different experience on the street and may believe that the approach-
ing officer is out to administer a little “street justice” of the type re-
cently documented in Boston and Los Angeles.245 
 
 239. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J.,  
dissenting). 
 240. Id. Justice Scalia claimed that the balance between those interests 
was dispositively struck by the framers, and by “[o]ur national tradition.” Id. 
That claim is dubious. See Colby, supra note 236, at 1126–38. 
 241. Colby, supra note 236. 
 242. 499 U.S. 621, 623 n.1 (1991). 
 243. Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth 
Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 748 n.110 (1992). 
 244. Id. at 749 n.110. 
 245. Id.; see also DAVID H. BAYLEY & HAROLD MENDELSOHN, MINORITIES 
AND THE POLICE: CONFRONTATION IN AMERICA 120 (1969) (“Our data have 
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The fact that Justice Scalia issued this tone-deaf opinion just a 
month after the entire “nation watched in horror as the vide-
otape depicting the brutal beating of Rodney King, an African 
American man, at the hands of more than a dozen white Los 
Angeles police officers played over and over on television 
screens across the country”246 is a testament to his diminished 
skill for empathy. Because he empathized only with the police 
officer, his balancing of the interests—his reasonableness calcu-
lation—failed to give fair consideration to the suspect’s interest. 
VI.  THE IDEAL EMPATHIC JUDGE   
When liberals call for judicial empathy, they do so because 
they believe that there is a better alternative. To be sure, liber-
als, every bit as much as anyone else, want judges who are su-
premely smart and accomplished—the cream of the crop. We all 
want judges with top-notch legal reasoning skills and unparal-
leled expertise in analyzing and working with complex statutes, 
regulations, and precedents. We all want our judges to be tal-
ented technocrats with razor-sharp legal minds.  
A. BROAD EMPATHY, NOT NARROW SYMPATHY 
Liberals also insist on judges who are impartial and who 
decide cases based solely on the law. If empathy were sympa-
thy,247 then conservatives would be right that its role in judging 
should be extremely limited.248 Good judges will often feel gen-
uinely sorry for a litigant while at the same time concluding 
that the law does not favor him.249 Any judge who determines 
 
shown that minority people carry into contacts with the police more negative 
expectations than do [whites]. One important result of these attitudes is the 
generation of a strong disposition to avoid the police.”); Tracey Maclin, “Black 
and Blue Encounters” Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment 
Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 276 (1991). 
 246. Kit Kinports, The Buck Does Not Stop Here: Supervisory Liability in 
Section 1983 Cases, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 147, 148. 
 247. See supra Part III (explaining the difference between empathy and 
sympathy).  
 248. Sympathy might play a legitimate role in criminal sentencing. See 
Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 258 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part in the 
judgment) (“Discretion to be compassionate or harsh is inherent in the sen-
tencing scheme . . . .”). 
 249. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 
189, 202–03 (1989) (noting that judges “are moved by natural sympathy in a 
case like this to find a way” for the aggrieved party to be compensated, yet 
they are compelled to follow the law); cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420–
21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The hard fact is that sometimes we must 
make decisions we do not like. We make them because they are right, right in 
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that the law favors—even if only slightly—one party, and yet 
rules for the other party is behaving lawlessly.250 By the same 
token, H. Jefferson Powell gets it exactly right when he con-
demns  
those who are happy to maintain the trappings of legal argument on 
the understanding, shared among those in the know, that the real de-
terminants of constitutional decision have nothing to do with the law. 
This is no mere impoverishment of law; it is the negation of law. Put 
into action, it is a betrayal: a judge who thinks legal reasoning is 
nothing more than a rationalization for decisions reached on other 
grounds, and yet announces those decisions in the name of the Con-
stitution, acts in bad faith. Such decisions may enjoy raw institutional 
power but they are lawless, as our tradition has understood law.251 
That is emphatically not what good judging entails. To the 
extent that there are or have been liberal judges who behave 
this way,252 or liberal academics who endorse this behavior, 
they do a disservice to liberalism and to the rule of law. A call 
for empathy in judging is not a call to decide cases on the basis 
of sympathy, or anything else other than law.253 
 
the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the  
result.”). 
 250. See Zipursky, supra note 184, at 1123–28 (arguing that concerns for 
the separation of powers and the rule of law do not permit a judge to choose a 
weaker, but still legally plausible, argument over a stronger argument based 
on sympathy, nor do they even permit judges to use sympathy as a “tie-
breaker” to choose between arguments whose strength is in equipoise). 
 251. H. Jefferson Powell, On Not Being “Not an Originalist,” 7 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 259, 280 (2010). 
 252. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 41, at 164 (recounting the recollections of 
a former D.C. Circuit law clerk whose judge allegedly told him, “This is how 
we go about our work: We learn the facts of the case, then we think long and 
hard about the fair outcome, the equitable disposition, the just result. Finally, 
we go find the law to support our conclusion”); Mark Tushnet, Themes in War-
ren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 748, 755–56 (1995) (describing an 
anecdote about Justice Abe Fortas who drafted an opinion consisting of un-
supported policy conclusions and then told his law clerk to “[d]ecorate it” with 
citations to legal authorities and suggesting that Fortas had been influenced 
by “the Yale legal realists who were his mentors and friends” to believe that 
“invocations of ‘the law’ were merely facades for policy preferences” and thus 
that, “[a]s a judge, . . . he had no need to work through what the law required 
before he arrived at a judgment”) (citing LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BI-
OGRAPHY 18, 271–72, 274 (1990)); cf. Tim Wells, Legends in the Law: A Con-
versation with Peter B. Edelman, WASH. LAW., Apr. 2008, at 29, 31 (recounting 
the recollection of a former law clerk that Justice Arthur J. Goldberg’s “first 
question in approaching a case always was, ‘What is the just result?’ Then he 
would work backward from the answer to that question to see how it would 
comport with relevant theory or precedent”). 
 253. See Henderson, supra note 134, at 1576 (rejecting the notion that em-
pathy and the rule of law “are mutually exclusive concepts”); Catherine Gage 
O’Grady, Empathy and Perspective in Judging: The Honorable William C. 
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A call for empathy in judging is instead a claim that judges 
need more than just smarts, experience, expertise, and impar-
tiality.254 To be sure, in the vast majority of cases, those skills 
will be enough to get the job done. In most routine cases, the 
law (and the proper application of the law to the facts at hand) 
is so clear that every minimally competent and honest judge 
would reach the same result. The scales are so far from equi-
poise that it would be virtually impossible for a smart and con-
scientious judge to come up with the wrong balance. President 
Obama was right that “adherence to legal precedent and rules 
of statutory or constitutional construction will dispose of 95 
percent of the cases that come before a court, so that both a 
Scalia and a Ginsburg will arrive at the same place most of the 
time on those 95 percent of the cases.”255 But President Obama 
was also right that, in the other five percent of cases, “adher-
ence to precedent and rules of construction and interpretation 
will only get you through the 25th mile of the marathon,”256 in 
the sense that different judges could reach different results on 
the basis of a sincere attempt to apply the governing law.257  
Because of the nature of both law application and lawmak-
ing in our judicial system,258 in order to successfully traverse 
that last mile—to definitively and fairly strike the close bal-
ance—judges also need an ability to understand the issue from 
the perspective of all of the parties, and to fully comprehend 
and appreciate the implications and impact of their rulings on 
 
Canby, Jr., 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 4, 10 (2001) (“Although empathy is sometimes 
used interchangeably with compassion, sympathy, and pity, empathy as a 
component of judicial decisionmaking does not mean experiencing sympathy or 
pity for another and allowing that sympathy to shape an outcome.”); Sophie H. 
Pirie, John T. Noonan as Judge: What Can Empathic Judging Mean for Wom-
en?, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 541, 544 (1996). 
 254. Cf. BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 53 (noting that empathy and IQ 
are independent of each other); id. at 123 (“[W]hen it comes to problem solv-
ing, clearly many situations require both logic and empathy. They are not mu-
tually exclusive.”); Jolliffe & Farrington, supra note 58, at 604 (presenting the 
results of a study that found very little correlation between intelligence and 
empathy).  
 255. 151 CONG. REC. S10,366 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Obama). 
 256. Id. 
 257. See Kagan Hearings, supra note 10, at 203 (“But we do know that not 
every case is decided 9-0, and that is not because anybody is acting in bad 
faith. It is because those legal judgments are ones in which reasonable people 
can reasonably disagree sometimes.”).  
 258. See supra Part IV.B. 
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all parties (and nonparties).259 They need a talent for empa-
thy.260 
Thus, Justice Kagan was spot-on at her confirmation hear-
ings when she responded to a question about President 
Obama’s call for empathy in judging by saying that, although 
she did not “want to speak for the president,” and did not 
“know what the president was speaking about specifically,” she 
did 
think that in approaching any case a judge is—is required really, not 
only permitted, but required to think very hard about what each par-
ty is saying, to try to see that case from each party’s eyes, in some 
sense to think about the case in the best light for each party, and then 
to weigh those against each other.261 
 
 259. See Interview with President Barack H. Obama (C-SPAN broadcast 
May 23, 2009), available at http://www.c-span.org/pdf/obamainterview.pdf (“I 
said earlier . . . that I thought empathy was an important quality and I con-
tinue to believe that. You have to have not only the intellect to be able to effec-
tively apply the law to cases before you. But you have to be able to stand in 
somebody else’s shoes and see through their eyes and get a sense of how the 
law might work or not work in practical day-to-day living.”); see also supra 
Part IV.A. 
 260. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE 86–90 (1995) (arguing 
that judges must apply neutral principles and be nonpartisan, but at the same 
time they must “develop as rich and comprehensive an understanding as pos-
sible of the situation of the groups involved in the case”); Bandes, supra note 
53, at 137 (“In the context of judicial decision-making, empathy is an essential 
capacity for understanding what’s at stake for the litigants. Ideally, a judge 
will have the capacity to put herself in the shoes of all those with a stake in 
her ruling.”); D’Arms, supra note 53, at 1494–95 (“It is surely only reasonable 
to grant that judgments we make after seeing what things feel like from sev-
eral such points of view are ipso facto better judgments.”); Jerome Frank, 
Corbin on Contracts Volume Three, 61 YALE L.J. 1108, 1112 (1952) (book re-
view) (“[T]he judicial judge . . . should be . . . quick with empathy, the capacity 
to feel himself into the minds and moods of other men.”) (paraphrasing Arthur 
Corbin); Massaro, supra note 64, at 2107 (noting that “an empathic person will 
better ‘hear’ all stories—that is, ‘both sides’—than one who heeds only one 
voice”); Thomas Morawetz, Empathy and Judgment, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
517, 523 (1996) (noting that empathy is a “second-order emotion[ ]”—a “mode[ ] 
of being in touch with the emotions, feelings, expectations, and vulnerabilities 
of others”: “What we expect from judges is not the experience of first-order 
emotions—such as fear, love, anger, distress—but the capacity to make moral-
ly significant decisions in the light of empathy with the first-order emotions of 
others.”); O’Grady, supra note 253, at 12 (advocating empathy in judicial deci-
sion making by which “a judge will seek to learn about a case by engaging in 
conceptual perspective taking and the active process of imagining another’s 
situation”); Wardlaw, supra note 3, at 1648 (“A judge’s work requires a capaci-
ty to understand the challenges faced by a wide range of potential litigants 
from across the spectrum of our society.”).  
 261. Kagan Hearings, supra note 10, at 103 (testimony of General Kagan).  
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In other words, “the judge is required to give consideration 
to each party, to try to figure out what the case looks like from 
that party’s point of view, that’s an important thing for a judge 
to do.”262 Still, Justice Kagan took pains to emphasize, “at the 
end of the day, what the judge does is . . . apply the law.”263 
“You are looking at law all the way down, not your political 
preferences, not your personal preferences.”264 
There is nothing extralegal or inappropriate about judicial 
empathy—certainly nothing that led conservatives to object 
when Justice Clarence Thomas testified at his confirmation 
hearings,  
I believe Senator, that I can make a contribution, that I can bring 
something different to the Court, that I can walk in the shoes of the 
people who are affected by what the Court does. . . . I say to myself 
almost everyday, “But for the grace of God, there go I.”265  
And certainly nothing that led conservatives to object when 
Justice Alito testified as his confirmation hearings that, when 
he hears an immigration case, he says to himself, “You know, 
this could be your grandfather, this could be your grandmother. 
They were not citizens at one time, and they were people who 
came to this country.”266 And when he hears a case involving 
children, he “can’t help but think of [his] own children and 
think about [his] children being treated in the way the children 
may be treated in the case that’s before [him].”267 Alito contin-
ued, “[a]nd that goes down the line. When I get a case about 
discrimination, I have to think about people in my own family 
 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 203. That Justice Kagan properly captured the essence of Presi-
dent Obama’s views is supported by the fact that President Obama spoke of 
empathy as “an essential ingredient for arriving at just decisions” in the same 
breath in which he claimed that he will “seek somebody who is dedicated to 
the rule of law” and “who respects the integrity of the judicial process and the 
appropriate limits of the judicial role.” Press Briefing by Press Secretary Rob-
ert Gibbs, supra note 8.  
 265. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
102d Cong. 260 (1991) (testimony of Judge Thomas); see also JEFFREY TOOBIN, 
THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 104–05 (2007) 
(“Being an RVer helps me do my job better. . . . The world I live in is very clois-
tered. The bulk of my adult life has been spent in Washington, D.C. RVing al-
lows me to get out and see the real America.” (quoting Justice Thomas’s re-
marks to the Recreational Vehicle Industry Association in 2004)). 
 266. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be 
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 333 (2006) (testimony of Judge Alito). 
 267. Id. at 475. 
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who suffered discrimination because of their ethnic background 
or because of religion or because of gender, and I do take that 
into account.”268 
Empathy of this sort is not only appropriate; it is essen-
tial.269 And given that some people are naturally better at it 
than others,270 we should seek judges who have evinced a pro-
clivity for empathy, just as we want judges who have proven 
themselves to be intelligent. And given that people apparently 
can improve their empathic skills,271 we should seek judges 
who have expressed an interest in, and a commitment to, em-
pathy.  
B. OVERCOMING EMPATHIC BLIND SPOTS 
A skeptic would certainly be warranted in asking why, if 
empathy in judging just means seeing and appreciating the 
human element of the case from all sides, does President 
Obama focus so much on empathy for particular groups?272 
Why does he say that he is specifically looking for someone 
with the “empathy to understand what it’s like to be poor, or 
African-American, or gay, or disabled, or old?”273 
The answer stems from the problem of empathic blind 
spots.274 All judges—unless they are psychopaths275—will in-
variably empathize to some degree with at least some of the 
parties before them. It would be impossible to even try to bal-
ance equities or interests if a judge did not at least subcon-
sciously appreciate another’s perspective. But everyone has a 
tendency to empathize more with those who are most like 
them—with those whose perspectives, experiences, and situa-
 
 268. Id.; see Bandes, supra note 53, at 137–38 (noting that Justices Thomas 
and Alito indicated that they “both intend to uphold the rule of law and are 
capable of empathy for those less fortunate”). 
 269. See supra Part IV.B. 
 270. See supra Part IV.C. 
 271. See supra Part IV.C. 
 272. See supra Part IV.A.; cf. David Limbaugh, Sotomayor, Reverse Empa-
thy and the Rule of Law, TOWNHALL (May 27, 2009 http://townhall.com/ 
columnists/davidlimbaugh/2009/05/27/sotomayor,_reverse_empathy_and_the_ 
rule_of_law/page/full/ (paraphrasing President Obama: “Forget what I just 
said about how judges should interpret, not make, the law. I want my judges 
to have empathy. And don’t tell anyone, but when I say ‘empathy,’ that’s code 
for bending the law to achieve the results I want based on the selective empa-
thy I have for certain victimized groups.”). 
 273. Dann, supra note 70 (quoting Barack Obama). 
 274. See supra Part IV.D. 
 275. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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tions are most like their own. Federal judges tend to come from 
certain backgrounds. They are likely to have privileged up-
bringings, elite educations, and professional experience as 
prosecutors, government attorneys, or corporate lawyers.276 As 
such, they will subconsciously tend to empathize with the pow-
erful, the elites, and the insiders. President Obama wants to 
make sure that he appoints judges who can also empathize 
with those whose experiences tend to be very far afield from 
those of most judges.277 Only then will the courts properly 
weigh unfamiliar interests in the greater calculus of the law.  
Of course, one way to seek to ensure that the interests of 
other groups will be understood and valued in the courts is to 
seek to ensure that more members of those groups are given 
the opportunity to serve as judges. Since they, too, will natural-
ly tend to empathize more with people like themselves, the ju-
diciary will take their interests into account in decision making 
simply by giving them a seat on the bench. That is indeed the 
motivation behind much of the call for greater diversity in the 
judiciary.278 
 
 276. See, e.g., Amy E. Black & Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill All the 
Lawyers First?: Insider and Outsider Views of the Legal Profession, 21 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 835, 839 (1998) (noting that many judges come from privi-
leged backgrounds and attended elite schools); Susan Haire et al., An 
Intercircuit Profile of Judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals, 78 JUDICATURE 
101, 102–03 (1994) (providing data that show that a high percentage of federal 
appellate judges have prior prosecutorial experience and attended elite law 
schools); Rorie L. Spill Solberg & Kathleen A. Bratton, Diversifying the Feder-
al Bench: Presidential Patterns, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 119, 124–25 (2005) (providing 
data that show that more than a third of federal district judges attended Top-
15 law schools and close to half of federal district judges have prior prosecuto-
rial experience, whereas only a tiny percentage have worked in legal aid, civil 
rights, or civil liberties organizations).  
 277. Thus, when President Obama lists downtrodden groups with whom he 
wants judges (and everyone for that matter) to empathize, he emphasizes that 
he lists those groups because they are different from us, and we cannot under-
stand their struggles while wearing our own shoes. See, e.g., CULTURE OF EM-
PATHY, supra note 67 (quoting Obama’s remarks at a Campus Progress Con-
ference on July 7, 2006, in which he argues for the need to close the “empathy 
deficit” by acquiring “the ability to put ourselves in someone else’s shoes; to 
see the world through those who are different from us—the child who’s hun-
gry, the laid-off steelworker, the immigrant woman cleaning your dorm 
room”). 
 278. See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role 
Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405, 411 (2000) 
(“[D]iversity on the bench . . . encourages judicial impartiality, by ensuring 
that a single set of values or views do not dominate judicial decision-making.”); 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Representative Government, Representative Court? 
The Supreme Court as a Representative Body, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1252, 1253 
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In fact, there are some skeptics out there who doubt that 
members of majority groups will ever successfully empathize 
with the powerless,279 and who therefore believe that diversity 
is the only solution to the problem of unconsciously biased judg-
ing in favor of the majority. Justice Sotomayor made her infa-
mous “wise Latina” remark in the context of arguing that, 
while “we should not be so myopic as to believe that others of 
different experiences or backgrounds are incapable of under-
standing the values and needs of people from a different 
group,” the fact of the matter is that, “to understand takes time 
and effort, something that not all people are willing to give. For 
others, their experiences limit their ability to understand the 
experiences of others. Others simply do not care.”280 Thus, 
there is a need for greater diversity on the bench.281 
Diversity is indeed important, but not just because it can 
substitute for empathy. More importantly, it can facilitate em-
pathy. It does not just mitigate the damage caused by empathic 
blind spots; it actually helps to eliminate those blind spots alto-
gether. The presence of some judges with different life experi-
ences can help to ensure that other judges—their colleagues—
are exposed to different perspectives and can properly compre-
hend and appreciate interests and struggles that are beyond 
their own realms of experience.282 To take the most famous ex-
ample, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s experiences with segrega-
tion and discrimination surely influenced his own voting. But 
they also influenced the voting of his fellow Justices, whose 
ability to empathize with the victims of discrimination was 
 
(2006) (arguing that, because it is “inevitable that judges’ different profession-
al and life experiences have some bearing on how they confront various prob-
lems that come before them,” it is “important . . . that courts . . . are comprised 
of individuals who represent a cross section of the country” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 279. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Eleventh Chronicle: Empathy and 
False Empathy, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 61 (1996). 
 280. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 
87, 92 (2002). 
 281. See id. at 89–90.  
 282. Cf. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does a Diverse Judiciary Attain a Rule of 
Law That Is Inclusive?: What Grutter v. Bollinger Has to Say About Diversity 
on the Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101, 145–46 (2004) (drawing upon the 
reasoning of Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), to argue that appointing 
a “critical mass” of minority judges will generate meaningful dialogue on the 
bench and will improve decision making because minority judges will inform 
their colleagues “when positive or negative racial dynamics may be impacting 
a legal issue in a way that is not readily discernible to a majority judge”). 
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heightened by his stories.283 Similarly, in most cases, it makes 
no difference to the votes of male appellate judges whether the 
other judges on the appellate panel happen to be men or wom-
en. But in sex discrimination cases—where their female col-
leagues are able to articulate an important, relevant perspec-
tive that men do not naturally appreciate—men are 
significantly more likely to vote in favor of female plaintiffs if 
one of the other judges on the panel is a woman.284  
Judges should not, however, have to depend on their col-
leagues to help them gain a fair appreciation for the unfamiliar 
interests of parties from other walks of life. Judges should have 
a skill for doing that on their own.285 And they should actively 
 
 283. See, e.g., DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 269 (2000) (quoting Justice O’Connor’s statement that 
Justice Marshall’s recounting his experiences was important to her because 
she had “no personal sense of being a minority in a society that cared primari-
ly for the majority”); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961–1991, at 5 (1997) (re-
counting Justice O’Connor’s belief that Justice Marshall “made clear . . . the 
impact of legal rules on human lives”); William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 23, 31 (1991) (claiming that 
Justice Marshall’s stories were “a form of education for the rest of us. Surely 
Justice Marshall recognized that the stories made us—his colleagues—
confront walks of life we had never known.”); Byron R. White, A Tribute to 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1992) (“Thurgood 
brought to the conference table years of experience in an area that was of vital 
importance to our work, experience that none of us could claim to 
match . . . . [H]e told us much that we did not know due to the limitations of 
our own experience.”).  
 284. See Boyd, supra note 222, at 406 (“[T]he likelihood of a male judge rul-
ing in favor of the plaintiff increases by 12% to 14% when a female sits on the 
panel.”).  
 285. Susan Bandes argues that empathy is not always useful and appro-
priate in the legal arena. See Bandes, supra note 226, at 365. She fears the 
“dark underbelly of empathy” when judges empathize with racists, spousal 
abusers, and the like. Id. at 376. In particular, she is concerned that, precisely 
because decision makers tend to favor their own perspective, allowing the 
judge to consider the emotional impact on all of the parties will just lead him 
to overvalue the emotional harm to persons with whom he identifies—since 
that is the harm that hits most close to home. “Often one story (usually the 
dominant story) drowns out or preempts another (usually the alternative sto-
ry).” Id. at 386. Thus, “for the alternative story to be heard, sometimes the 
dominant story must be excluded.” Id. Her point is not easily dismissed. But 
ultimately, it just goes to show the need for genuinely empathic judges. Like it 
or not, the judge will instinctively understand and value the dominant story, 
even if it is not explicitly told. What we need is a judge with the will and the 
capacity to ensure that the alternative story is heard and fully appreciated, 
regardless of how powerfully the dominant story resonates with his natural 
inclination to share the dominant perspective.  
By the same token, Toni Massaro is certainly correct when she asserts 
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seek to overcome their own empathic blind spots by self-
consciously endeavoring to understand the perspective of oth-
ers.286 For instance, in the case involving the reasonableness of 
the strip search of a 13-year-old girl at school, discussed above 
in Part IV.B.1, Justice Ginsburg was naturally able to empa-
thize with the adolescent girl. She had “been a 13-year-old girl” 
herself.287 But Justice Breyer found it difficult to understand 
just what the big deal was. At oral argument, Justice Breyer 
asked the girl’s attorney to help him to understand the girl’s 
perspective: 
I’m trying to work out why is this a major thing to say strip down to 
your underclothes, which children do when they change for gym, they 
do fairly frequently, not to—you know, and there are only two women 
there. Is—how bad is this, underclothes? That’s what I’m trying to get 
at. I’m asking because I don’t know.288 
Justice Breyer was actively seeking to overcome his own em-
pathic blind spots. Having done so, he ultimately joined the 
Court’s opinion declaring the search unconstitutional upon a 
“careful balancing of [the] governmental and private interests,” 
 
that the law “cannot ‘empathize’ with everyone equally.” Massaro, supra note 
64, at 2109. But this Article does not (or not precisely anyway) share her view 
that the “significant modern question[ ] . . . [is] not whether judges and ‘law’ 
should ‘empathize,’ . . . but with whom should we [selectively] empathize?” Id. 
at 2110. It is true that “all stories cannot dominate,” and that the law must 
ultimately establish substantive rules that tend to favor some interests over 
others. Id. at 2110, 2116. But it is not always true that the “concept of empa-
thy cannot . . . assist us in making these hard choices.” Id. at 2116. In fact, 
empathy can help the judges who are making the law to better understand all 
perspectives before choosing which one to privilege. See supra Part IV.B.3. In 
this manner, it can at least “assist” in making the hard choices, even if it does 
not obviate the need for those choices altogether. And in any event, empathy 
can be an integral tool in applying substantive law (however skewed that law 
might be) in the most fair manner possible. It is possible to empathize in that 
process broadly, rather than selectively, and whether judges should actively 
try to do so remains an important issue in modern discourse. 
 286. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN 
AMERICAN JUSTICE 414 (1973) (arguing that judges must recognize their own 
prejudices and biases in order to nullify their effect); Miller, supra note 53, at 
1001 (arguing that empathy “should be an accepted and meaningful tool for 
judges” because it “is a crucial cognitive mechanism that can help compensate 
for common cognitive bias”); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. 
L.J. 1129, 1166 (1999) (noting that “some legal commentators have suggested 
that the adoption of simple or commonsense mental devices, such as engaging 
in introspective self-criticism or attempting to feel empathy for people who are 
‘different,’ will go a long way towards banishing cognitive bias from persons’ 
thinking”). 
 287. Biskupic, supra note 90 (quoting Justice Ginsburg). 
 288. Transcript of Oral Argument, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Red-
ding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (No. 08-479), 2009 WL 1064200 at *48–49. 
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in which the Court recognized that, from the girl’s perspective, 
the search was “embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating,” 
that “adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusive-
ness of the exposure,” and that the “degrading” emotional im-
pact of such a search bears no resemblance to “[c]hanging for 
gym.”289 That is just what a judge should do.  
C. EMPATHY AND POLITICS 
I hasten to add that this is not to say that empathic judg-
ing necessitates a decision for the girl, rather than the school. 
It is just to say that empathic judging requires a willingness 
and an ability to emotionally relate to the girl’s side of the case, 
not just the administrators’. And more generally, this is not to 
say that empathic judging necessarily leads to liberal results, 
or is or should be the province of liberal judges alone. It is the 
President’s critics who have sought to equate empathy with lib-
eralism. In truth, conservatives are of course capable of empa-
thy too,290 and all judges should endeavor to empathize broadly 
in every case. Empathic judging is not liberal judging; it is good 
judging. Indeed, one can easily imagine a non-empathic liberal 
judge who naturally understands (and thus overvalues) the 
girl’s perspective, but utterly fails to give fair weight to the 
substantial interest of the school administrators.291 And step-
ping back, one could surely come up with examples of knee-jerk 
liberal judges who habitually and instinctively tend to see cases 
only from the perspective of the little guy and routinely fail to 
empathize with government, corporate, or wealthy actors.292 
We should all be able to agree that that is bad judging too.  
 
 289. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 129 S. Ct. at 2639, 2641–42. Justice 
Thomas, by contrast, asked no questions at oral argument, and authored a 
dissent that repeatedly empathizes with the difficult position in which the 
school administrators were placed, but utterly fails to acknowledge the embar-
rassment visited upon the student. See id. at 2646–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 290. But cf. GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND CON-
SERVATIVES THINK 32–36 (2002) (suggesting that the liberal moral value sys-
tem differs from the conservative one in that, to liberals, morality is heavily 
correlated with empathy).  
 291. Unlike Justice Souter, who made a conscious effort to empathize with 
the administrators. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 292. This charge has, for instance, been leveled against Justice Brennan, 
who once explained, “What got me interested in people’s rights and liberties 
was the kind of family and the kind of neighborhood I was brought up in. I 
saw all kinds of suffering—people had to struggle.” Nat Hentoff, The Constitu-
tionalist, NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 1990, at 45, 46. As a child, Brennan “learned 
to sympathize with the underdog.” SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE 
BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 21 (2010). In law school, he served on the Legal 
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Indeed, one might wonder if the entire national debate 
about judicial empathy has been nothing more than an over-
blown semantic miscommunication.293 Conservatives have mis-
takenly conflated empathy with sympathy—hardly an unfor-
givable sin, given that the two terms are often used 
interchangeably in popular discourse. As a result they have 
perceived a great rift in judicial philosophy that is not really 
there. In fact, everyone agrees that sympathy is an inappropri-
ate basis for judicial decision making,294 and maybe everyone 
agrees that empathy, properly defined, is a desirable quality in 
a judge. Perhaps we are all on the same page substantively; we 
just need to get our terms straight.  
I would not go quite that far. We are probably all closer to 
one another than the tiresome partisan rhetoric would suggest, 
but at a fundamental level we do remain genuinely divided. 
Most conservatives, it seems, continue to accept the notion of 
judicial umpiring, and with it the belief that cases can and 
should virtually always be resolved without regard to the iden-
tity, feelings, and circumstances of the particular parties. As 
 
Aid Bureau, where he “was exposed . . . to . . . the plight of the poor” and came 
to empathically understand how the problems of the poor “‘can assume terrify-
ing proportions for the people concerned.’” Id. at 20 (quoting Justice Brennan). 
Some scholars have suggested that “Justice Brennan’s empathy for that suf-
fering was one of the most important aspects of his greatness as a Justice.” 
Morton J. Horwitz, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 
23, 24 (1997). But others have argued that, “when we say Brennan was empa-
thetic, we mean he was empathetic to certain groups for which we feel empa-
thy. The other justices may also be empathetic, but to groups that we do not 
readily notice or do not sympathize with.” Robert Nagel, Will the Brennan 
Legacy Endure?, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 177, 193 (1999) (providing the re-
marks of Robert Nagel). These critics charge, in other words, that Justice 
Brennan routinely empathized only with the sympathetic underdog. Cf. Frank 
I. Michelman, Super Liberal Romance, Community, and Tradition in William 
J. Brennan, Jr.’s Constitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1279–80 (1991) 
(noting Justice Brennan’s “relative coldness toward managerial and bureau-
cratic interests in order, calculation, and control,” observing that, “[i]n a dizzy-
ing succession of doctrinal contexts . . . Justice Brennan has been the Court’s 
predictable anchor against allowing governments and their officials to fend off 
liability,” and suggesting that “this whole pack of opinions impliedly demurs to 
pleas that liability impairs governmental efficiency, deters governmental ap-
plication, or, by rendering life in office unruly and uncomfortable, hinders the 
government’s ability to attract the best talent to public service”).  
 293. See West, supra note 84 (manuscript at 6–7) (noting the possibility 
that “the anti-empathy turn in our thinking about law might be proceeding 
apace on the basis of a sizable definitional mistake”). 
 294. But see id. at 33 (arguing that “the judge must embrace, not shy away 
from, his capacity for empathic and sympathetic engagement with the parties 
before him”). 
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discussed above, that vision can lead to selective empathy and 
bad judging. To be sure, conservative judges could overcome 
this shortcoming and still be judicial conservatives. Empathy 
need not, and should not, be the unique province of liberal 
judges. But at this point in time, it appears that most conserva-
tives do not understand judging in this way.  
D. THE RISKS OF EMPATHY 
Is there a downside to broadly empathic judges? One might 
worry that judges who possess high degrees of empathy would 
also tend toward high degrees of sympathy. After all, it stands 
to reason that the more that one can truly understand and tru-
ly feel the pain and despair of another who is suffering, the 
more likely one would be to feel sorry for the sufferer. And one 
might further worry that judges who tend toward greater sym-
pathy (as a result of their greater capacity for empathy) would 
also tend, whether consciously or subconsciously, to twist the 
law to help the downtrodden litigants for whom they feel most 
sorry, even when the law does not favor them. Having empa-
thized with all of the parties, the judge may well sympathize 
with only one of them—the poor, oppressed, suffering victim. 
And then the judge may subconsciously allow that heartfelt 
sympathy to color her ultimate decision. In other words, even if 
in theory empathy and sympathy are conceptually distinct 
phenomena, perhaps in reality they go hand in hand. And thus, 
perhaps the President’s critics are ultimately right that a com-
mitment to judicial empathy will inexorably lead to a judiciary 
that illegitimately decides cases on the basis of sympathy for 
the oppressed, rather than on the basis of law. 
This is a nontrivial concern. For a possible example that 
also illustrates that judicial empathy is not a uniquely liberal 
phenomenon, consider Justice Alito’s solo dissents in two recent 
free speech cases—one involving revolting video depictions of 
animal cruelty, and the other involving reprehensible, mali-
cious protesting at military funerals.295 In his dissents, Justice 
Alito empathized with the speech victims. He felt the “incalcu-
lable loss” and “severe and lasting emotional injury” suffered 
“at a time of acute emotional vulnerability” by the grieving 
parent of the deceased soldier,296 and he both stressed that the 
 
 295. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222–29 (2011) (Alito, J., dis-
senting); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592–1602 (2010) (Alito, 
J., dissenting).  
 296. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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“animals used in [the cruel] videos are living creatures that ex-
perience excruciating pain,” and offered extensive descriptions 
of the horrible suffering that the animals endure.297 In both of 
these cases, all eight of the other Justices—liberals and con-
servatives alike—had little problem finding that the law clearly 
favors the repulsive and unsympathetic animal torturers and 
protestors. As Michael Dorf explains, “[w]hat distinguishes 
Justice Alito’s position from that of the majority in both [cases] 
is the clear depth of feeling he expresses for the victims of the 
speech . . . . Justice Alito feels more for the victims, or at least 
permits his feelings to play a larger role in his legal analysis 
than the rest of the Court does.”298 Perhaps Justice Alito al-
lowed his empathy to turn into sympathy, and then allowed his 
sympathy to lead him to results that were contrary to the law.  
Indeed, we can draw a cautious lesson in this regard from 
two psychological studies published by professors at the Uni-
versity of Kansas in 1995.299 In the first study, subjects be-
lieved that they were functioning as supervisors and were 
asked to assign subordinates to one of two tasks—a desirable 
one and an undesirable one. The subjects, who were divided in-
to two groups, received an emotionally moving note ostensibly 
from one of the persons being assigned to a task. In the note, 
the subordinate explained that she was feeling depressed be-
cause her boyfriend had recently broken up with her and that 
she really needed something good to happen to her to cheer her 
up. One of the subject groups was instructed to “try to take an 
objective perspective toward what is described [in the note]. Try 
not to get caught up in how . . . she feels; just remain objective 
and detached.”300 The other group was told to “try to imagine 
how [she] feels about what is described. Try to imagine how it 
has affected . . . her life and how . . . she feels as a result.”301 
Those subjects who were instructed to remain objective and 
avoid empathy assigned the woman to the desirable task only 
half of the time. The subjects who were told to empathize with 
the woman assigned her to the desirable task seventy-five per-
 
 297. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1598–1602 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 298. Mike Dorf, Could Empathy Explain Justice Alito’s Lone Dissents in 
Free Speech Cases, DORF ON LAW (Mar. 7, 2011, 12:22 AM), http://www 
.dorfonlaw.org/2011/03/could-empathy-explain-justice-alitos.html. 
 299. See C. Daniel Batson et al., Immorality from Empathy-Induced Altru-
ism: When Compassion and Justice Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 
1042–54 (1995). 
 300. Id. at 1044.  
 301. Id. 
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cent of the time.302 Although many of the subjects who had 
been asked to empathize intentionally gave the downtrodden 
woman favorable treatment, they nonetheless were overwhelm-
ingly of the belief that flipping a coin was the most fair way to 
assign the tasks.303 This fact led the researchers to conclude 
“that although empathy induction introduced considerable par-
tiality, it did not change participants’ perceptions of fairness or 
justice in the situation.”304 In other words, the subjects who en-
gaged in empathy found that it led them to sympathize with 
the woman—the study found that those who were asked to em-
pathize were more likely to report feelings of sympathy and 
compassion305—and that sympathy, in turn, led them to reach a 
result that was counter to their own sense of fairness and jus-
tice. 
In the second study, subjects were told that they were be-
ing asked to evaluate the effectiveness of radio advertisements 
for a (fictitious) charitable organization that was seeking dona-
tions to help improve quality of life for children with terminal 
illnesses. Subjects were divided into two groups, each of which 
was asked to adopt a particular perspective when listening to 
the fundraising advertisement. Subjects in the first group were 
asked to “try to take an objective perspective” and to “[t]ry not to 
get caught up in how the child [in the advertisement] . . . feels; 
just remain objective and detached.”306 Subjects in the second 
group were told to “try to imagine how the child . . . feels about 
what has happened and how it has affected this child’s life. Try 
to feel the full impact of what this child has been through and 
how . . . she feels as a result.”307 The advertisement featured a 
heartbreaking interview with “Sheri,” a (fictitious) ten-year-old 
girl who allegedly suffered from a fatal muscle-paralyzing dis-
ease that left her unable to walk more than a few steps in her 
heavy braces without falling down.308 The advertisement ex-
plained that there was a drug that would allow Sheri full use of 
her arms and legs even as her fatal disease inevitably pro-
gressed.309 Sheri spoke in her interview of how much she 
 
 302. Id. at 1045. 
 303. Id. at 1045–46.  
 304. Id. at 1046. 
 305. See id. at 1045. 
 306. Id. at 1048. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 1049. 
 309. Id.  
 2012] JUDICIAL EMPATHY 2011 
 
missed playing with her friends and how her mother had told 
her of a drug that would let her ride her bike and go to school 
again.310 The advertisement explained that the drug was very 
expensive; the charitable organization was hoping to raise the 
money to provide it to Sheri.311  
After listening to the advertisement, each subject was in-
formed that there was a waitlist for charitable assistance, and 
that most children on the waitlist would die before they could 
be helped.312 Each subject was then told that the charitable or-
ganization had agreed, as a way of thanking the subject for his 
or her assistance, to give him or her the power to move Sheri to 
the top of the waitlist.313 The subjects were warned, however, 
“of the consequences of such a decision. Moving [Sheri] 
up . . . means that children who are currently higher on the 
Waiting List, due to earlier application, greater need, or shorter 
life expectancy will have to wait longer.”314 Subjects who had 
been told to empathize with Sheri reported a greater degree of 
sympathy for her plight, and were far more likely to move her 
to the front of the waitlist, at the expense of other children who 
were in greater need.315 The researchers concluded that, 
“[r]ather than producing a general sensitivity to the needs of 
all, empathy increased sensitivity to the need of the individual 
who was the target of empathy,” at the expense of the basic 
value of equal justice for all.316  
These studies suggest that the concern that empathic judg-
es might tend towards unjust sympathy should not be taken 
lightly. But it should also not be overstated. The subjects in 
these studies were asked to empathize with only one person—
just the sort of selective empathy that empathic judging aims to 
avoid. The subjects were not asked or given the opportunity to 
empathize with all of the parties who would be affected by their 
decisions.317 In addition, there is no evidence that the subjects 
 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id.  
 315. Id. at 1049–50. 
 316. Id. at 1050.  
 317. Economists sometimes worry that policymakers overemphasize the 
immediate and obvious costs and benefits of their decisions—the “seen” ef-
fects—and underemphasize the remote and less obvious costs and benefits—
the “unseen” effects. For instance, it is easy to appreciate the benefits to low 
income earners of raising the minimum wage, but harder to appreciate the po-
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of these studies were unusually empathic people; they were not 
screened in any way for empathic abilities or proclivities. Thus, 
these studies give us no reason to think that highly empathic 
people (and judges) are any more likely to lapse into sympathy 
than less empathic people (and judges). To the contrary, neural 
imaging studies reveal that sympathy and empathy are con-
trolled by different regions of the brain.318 As such, they do not 
generally go hand in hand. Psychological experiments have 
found that many people are very sympathetic, but not particu-
larly empathic—they “exhibit considerable concern for the 
plight of others, without experiencing congruent emotions.”319 
That is to say, they “have a tendency to be sympathetic but not 
empathetic.”320 Many other people “are very empathetic but do 
not have a tendency to feel concern or pity for others in 
need.”321 In other words, empirical research supports the prop-
ositions that “sympathy and empathy are statistically inde-
pendent” and “that they reflect different psychological process-
es.”322 Thus, the evidence that greater empathy leads people to 
be more likely to take action in favor of the sympathetic “is ac-
tually quite weak.”323 An ideal empathic judge should surely be 
 
tential costs to persons whose jobs might be lost or never created, or to con-
sumers who might end up paying higher prices to offset increased labor costs. 
Cf. Frédéric Bastiat, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen, LIBRARY ECON. & 
LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Bastiat/basEss1.html (last visited May 
2, 2012) (“In the economic sphere . . . a law produces not only one effect, but a 
series of effects. Of these effects, the first alone is immediate; . . . it is seen. 
The other effects emerge only subsequently; they are not seen. . . . There is only 
one difference between a bad economist and a good one: the bad economist con-
fines himself to the visible effect; the good economist takes into account both 
the effect that can be seen and those effects that must be foreseen.”). By the 
same token, it is important for empathic judges to avoid empathizing only 
with those whose plight is most obvious or apparent.  
 318. See Decety & Michalska, supra note 58, at 896 (presenting the results 
of a neural imaging study that “document[s] partially distinct neural mecha-
nisms subserving empathy and sympathy”). 
 319. Richendoller & Weaver, supra note 59, at 309.  
 320. Id. at 310.  
 321. Id. 
 322. Rand J. Gruen & Gerald Mendelsohn, Emotional Responses to Affec-
tive Displays in Others: The Distinction Between Empathy and Sympathy, 51 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 609, 613 (1986). Empathy for those in distress 
can sometimes produce sympathy (concern for and a desire to help the suffer-
er), but it can also produce what psychiatrists call “personal distress”—a self-
oriented sense of personal discomfort. See N. Eisenberg & R.A. Fabes, Empa-
thy: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Relation to Prosocial Behavior, 14 
MOTIVATION & EMOTION 131, 131–49 (1990).  
 323. Jesse J. Printz, Is Empathy Necessary for Morality?, in EMPATHY: 
PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (P. Goldie & A. Coplan 
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aware of the dangers of excessive sympathy, and should take 
great pains to ensure that her empathy does not lead to sub-
conscious sympathy-based judging. But there is no reason to 
think that judges with a high capacity or penchant for empathy 
are at a substantially greater risk than their peers of rendering 
improperly sympathetic rulings.324 Indeed, highly empathic 
judges would probably be more likely to empathize broadly 
with all parties, rather than narrowly only with the obviously 
sympathetic sufferers—the low-hanging emotional fruit—which 
would actually lessen the risk of sympathetic decisions.  
  CONCLUSION   
In opposing the confirmation of Justice Sotomayor, Senator 
Charles Grassley insisted that empathy has no role to play in 
good judging: 
Justice is blind. Empathy is not. Empathetic judges take off the blind-
folds and look at the party instead of merely weighing the evidence in 
light of what the law is. Empathetic judges put their thumbs on the 
scales of justice, altering the balance that is delicately crafted by the 
law. Empathetic judges exceed their role as part of the judicial branch 
and improperly take extraneous, nonlegal factors into consideration. 
That is why President Obama’s judicial standard of empathy is  
 
eds.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1, 8). Studies show no correlation between 
empathy and prosocial behavior in children; some studies actually show nega-
tive correlation. See id. Studies involving adults show only modest correlation. 
See id. (manuscript at 9). Indeed, not only does empathy not correlate with 
sympathy (and thus not lead to altruistic action), but also, the experimental 
evidence suggests that even sympathy may not correlate well with altruistic 
action. Compare Harvey Ginsburg & Tammy Silakowski, Comparing Empathy 
and Selfish Rationales Motivating Preschool Children’s Decisions About Wear-
ing Vision-Obscuring Opaque Eyeglasses, 3 J. EDUC. & HUMAN DEV. 1 (2009) 
(finding a link between sympathy and altruism), and Gruen & Mendelsohn, 
supra note 322, at 609 (recounting studies that have found such a link), with 
Christopher J. Einolf, Empathic Concern and Prosocial Behaviors: A Test of 
Experimental Results Using Survey Data, 34 SOC. SCI. RES. 1267–79 (2008) 
(concluding that people who are inherently more sympathetic are generally 
not more likely to engage in prosocial behavior).  
 324. That a capacity for empathy need not lead to sympathy can be illus-
trated by the work of the famous relative of one of the world’s leading empathy 
scholars. Professor Simon Baron-Cohen’s cousin is actor and comedian Sacha 
Baron-Cohen. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 56, at 113. Sacha Baron-Cohen’s 
performances as the bumbling Borat depend on a masterful empathic ability 
to understand the uncomfortable feelings that his outrageous behavior causes 
in those around him, but he mercilessly takes no action to quell their misery. 
See BORAT: CULTURAL LEARNINGS OF AMERICA FOR MAKE BENEFIT GLORIOUS 
NATION OF KAZAKHSTAN (20th Century Fox 2006); DA ALI G SHOW (HBO tele-
vision broadcast 2003–04).  
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problematic . . . .325 
That is exactly wrong—just about as wrong as it is possible 
to be. Empathic judges do not exceed their role as part of the 
judicial branch, and they do not improperly take nonlegal fac-
tors into consideration. They simply use empathy to ascertain 
and make sense of the relevant facts and to apply the relevant 
legal factors—thus fulfilling, rather than abdicating, their role 
within the judicial branch. They do not place their thumbs on 
one side of the scales of justice, altering the delicate balance 
crafted by the law. They simply use the tool of empathy to de-
termine the proper weight to be placed on each side of the scale, 
so that they can properly decide cases according to the balance 
crafted by the law. 
 I therefore respectfully but emphatically disagree with Pro-
fessor Kerr’s assertion that President Obama’s call for judicial 
empathy means that the President does not believe that a  
judge must weigh the best legal arguments on one side and the best 
legal arguments for the other, and must pick the side that has the 
better of it, no matter how slight the advantage. If a case is 55/45, 
then there is a correct answer, because 55 is greater than 45.326 
Empathic judges are no different. They too must always 
find in favor of the party that they perceive to have the strong-
er legal argument. The call for empathy in judging is not prem-
ised on a belief that, “[s]o long as there is some appreciable le-
gal ambiguity . . . [m]aybe 70/30 is enough, or maybe even 
75/25 will do . . . . [T]he judge can rule in a way that furthers 
whatever normative vision of the law that the judge happens to 
like.”327 
That is not how an empathic judge (or any other judge 
committed to the rule of law) goes about deciding a case. Empa-
thy comes into play in deciding which legal conclusion is 
stronger—in assigning the percentages, not in overriding them.  
Those who support judicial empathy are just as committed 
to the rule of law as anyone else. We want judges who follow 
the law, too.328 But we recognize that the law is often sufficient-
 
 325. 155 CONG. REC. S8,780 (Aug. 4, 2009) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
 326. Kerr, supra note 42.  
 327. Id. 
 328. See supra notes 247–53, 263–64 and accompanying text. In a fascinat-
ing forthcoming essay, Robin West argues (and laments) that the “anti-
empathic turn” in our legal thinking is the product of a “‘paradigm shift’ . . . in 
our ideals of good judging.” West, supra note 84 (manuscript at 8). Whereas 
the traditional, common law view of judging was particularistic and backward-
looking, the emerging post-Realist view of judging is general and forward-
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ly ambiguous or open-ended that there is no objectively correct 
answer that can be discerned simply by calling balls and 
strikes. We want judges who acknowledge that reality, and who 
recognize that the failure to do so not only is arrogant and ig-
norant, but also undermines justice by facilitating unconscious 
favoritism. Empathy is not an obstacle to judicial neutrality; it 
is a requirement of judicial neutrality. Thus, we want judges 
who are capable of empathy and who seek to engage in it. 
After all, a judge who cannot or will not empathize well is 
at a great disadvantage. How can she effectively apply (or craft) 
legal tests if she lacks the ability to accurately assign value to 
the relevant variables in the legal calculus? If “Lady Justice 
doesn’t have empathy for anyone,”329 then she is a lousy judge. 
 
looking. We no longer understand the central task of the judge to be the reso-
lution of a particular dispute between individual parties. Rather, we now un-
derstand the judge primarily to be in the business of making “social policy” by 
“act[ing] as a quasi-legislator within the interstices of rules laid down.” Id. at 
36. And when it comes to undertaking that task, “[e]mpathy need not be in the 
toolkit.” Id. at 10. If this is correct, it is certainly ironic, given that the public 
critique of judicial empathy comes from those who rail against so-called “legis-
lating from the bench.” See supra Parts I, II. But in any event, despite the 
views of some economists, see West, supra note 84 (manuscript at 40–43), even 
legislators need empathy to make good social policy. See BARON-COHEN, supra 
note 56, at 103–04. 
 329. Long, supra note 37.  
